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I have been working in the field of anti-money laundering in some capacity as a junior analyst 
and later as a consultant. A common theme in organizations that I have worked for was always 
the difficulty in getting stakeholders on board with putting in place measures and controls that 
can have a real impact. Going through the literature and research by scholars in this field 
broadened my view on this topic and I now realise the many difficulties that organizations 
face when trying to implement these rules. This is not to suggest that they should be given a 
pass when their organization becomes a conduit for money laundering activity, but rather it is 
to suggest that there is a shared responsibility of those who set the rules, those who interpret 
them and those who execute them. 
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thesis. Her expertise and wide-reaching knowledge around law and economics, corruption and 
money laundering (I’m sure it’s not limited to these areas) proved to be a source of invaluable 
input. It is not an overstatement to say that without her supervision, I would not have stayed 
on track and completed this thesis on time, which were thoughts plaguing me at the start of 
the semester. With that I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks and gratitude to her in 
providing guidance and support. 
 
Further, writing a thesis in such unprecedented times when a pandemic still ominously looms 
over one’s shoulder, where conflict is rife in many parts of the world, where the advent of 
technology not only brings convenience and accessibility but also brings distractions and 
unwanted stimuli, I would like to thank friends and family who have made themselves 
available in whatever capacity that they could. I appreciate and thank those who have extended 
their help in any way shape or form, be it helping me with translating documents, with 
troubleshooting STATA, or just simply lending a listening ear to a grumpy individual and his 
incessant rants. 
 
Finally, I hope you, the reader, will enjoy going through the thesis as much as I have writing 
it. 
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The risk-based approach (RBA) was initially introduced in 2013 by the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) as a solution to the increasing volumes of suspicious activity reports (SARs) 
filed by regulated entities and the subsequent workload on enforcement authorities. However, 
since then, suspicious reports have not shown a dramatic decrease in volume but has in fact 
been increasing, suggesting a potential relationship between the two. One of the main reasons 
surround the uncertainty and ambiguity that both regulators and regulated entities face when 
interpreting what constitutes low, medium or high risk when it comes to assessing risk in their 
own context. This is highlighted from AML activities such as identification of politically 
exposed persons and beneficial owners as well as the risk categorization of countries. To 
investigate this potential relationship, a regression analysis is performed using SAR data on 
compliance scores from the 4th round of Mutual Evaluation Reports (MERs). Mutual 
evaluations are a process for FATF to understand how well a country is performing on each 
of their 40 recommendations (FATF, 2021) thus the scores from these reports act as an 
indicator for how closely a country follows the RBA recommendation from FATF. The results 
indicate that there is a significant and positive relationship between the two variables. 
Countries that achieve higher scores, which indicate that they follow the RBA closely (in large 
part due to potential fines and exclusion from the global financial system), file more SARs. 
Because some institutions may choose not to follow this approach so closely, variations across 
countries occur. This suggests that the description of the RBA is too broad and ambiguous, 
leaving each country’s regulators and regulated entities uncertain as to what constitutes low 
or high-risk activity. To hedge against this uncertainty and err on the side of caution, regulated 
entities rather choose to report transactions on the border of being suspicious, contributing to 
a problem known as defensive reporting, leading to a further increase in SAR volumes. When 
SAR volumes are too high, each subsequent report loses credibility thus diminishing the value 
that the SAR regime can provide, what is termed the phenomenon of the ‘Crying Wolf’. The 
outcome of this analysis provides a starting point towards the conversation that indeed, the 
risk-based approach does contribute to increased SAR levels and variation across countries. 
Consequently, the risk-based approach can be further refined to reduce uncertainty that 
governments, regulators and regulated entities face. Hopefully, by doing so, the value of 
reporting suspicious activity is preserved and allows SAR levels to be used as a meaningful 




In July 1989, the Heads of State or Government of seven leading industrialised countries (G7-
USA, Japan, Germany, France, UK, Italy and Canada), together with the President of the 
European Commission, convened, from summit participants and eight other countries 
(Sweden, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Austria, Spain and 
Australia), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The FATF was mandated as an inter-
governmental policy making body to combat money laundering, especially drug-related 
money laundering. The responsibilities of the FATF were facilitated through a series of 
meetings of experts and three working groups, which resulted in a 1990 report containing 40 
Recommendations to deal with money laundering. One of the main requirements was the duty 
of reporting suspicious activities by certain types of entities of member states to contribute to 
its ongoing efforts, proportional to its GDP (Van Duyne et al, 2018). The FATF represents 
more of an informal transnational, multi-level network rather than a formal hierarchical 
international organization (Nance, 2018). It should be noted that what the FATF proposes are 
in essence soft laws as they do not have jurisdictional authority. The FATF is unable to enforce 
any regulation. Individual member states must interpret and write on their own, regulations 
(hard laws) that fit the 40 recommendations proposed by the FATF. When it comes to 
enforcement, it is the individual states that act on it, through the hard laws that are passed in 
the state, not FATF. But because of its extensive influence over member countries and ability 
to exert pressure over non-members through its membership structure, its recommendations 
and guidelines have acted as the ‘de-facto’ regulation, adopted by most nations. 
 
The use of suspicious activity reports (SARs) as a tool for enforcement agencies to detect 
money laundering activity has been ongoing for some time. Regulated entities were required 
to file Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) as part of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) in 1970 
enacted by the United States, when processing transactions reaching more than USD 10,000.  
 
It was later added as an additional requirement in 1992, to also have regulated entities file 
Currency and Monetary Instrument Reports (CMIRs) for customers intending to transfer 
currency and monetary instruments for a minimum USD 5,000 in and out of the country. This 
evolved as part of efforts to prevent financial institutions from being used as conduits for 
illegal activity. However, the idea of money laundering was hardly known to the layperson 
until the terrorist attacks of September 11 in 2001. This put financial institutions and terrorism 
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financing at the forefront of mainstream media, and for the first time, presented a link between 
money laundering and terrorism financing. No less because of the devastating nature of the 
crime and amount of harm that was inflicted; it was reported that the amount of casualties 
amounted to 2,977 (CNN, 2020), it was also equally appalling that financial institutions were 
found to have been used as mediums to channel funds to Al-Qaeda, which enabled the 
organization to eventually carry out such an organized attack on humanity. A ‘war on terror’ 
ensued, which kickstarted part of several significant policy developments both in the United 
States (USA Patriot Act) and globally around the world. The international community, such 
as the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and the FATF introduced several sets of 
regulations targeted to fight terrorism in what it became known as Combating the Financing 
of Terrorism (CFT) measures alongside its Anti-Money Laundering (AML) measures, 
guidelines and directives. A key element of FATF’s efforts is its detailed list of appropriate 
standards for countries to implement. These measures are set out in the 40 Recommendations, 
first issued in 1990 and later revised several times until 2012 (ACAMS, 2016). In addition to 
the those, FATF adopted nine special recommendations on terrorist financing. These 
recommendations by the FATF have become the de facto practice that serves as starting points 
for countries in their effort to implement an effective national AML and CFT regime. Based 
on these recommendations, the SAR requirement also covers terrorist activities. 
 
From this, it seems that the filing of SARs is seen as a central and key tool in the ambition of 
policy makers to identify and prevent suspicious/terrorist activity within regulated entities, 
and to discourage the use of these entities as mediums to disguise the origin of funds gained 
through illegal means. As a result, the number of SARs filed by institutions in the United 
States and globally around the world have increased significantly (Ryder and Turksen, 2013). 
The introduction of the RBA by the FATF was seen as a solution to rising SAR levels 
stemming from traditional ‘check the box’ mechanisms like the CTR. However, SAR levels 
continued to rise. Research has shown that a large part may be attributed to ‘defensive 
reporting’ (Ross and Hannan, 2007) where financial institutions file SARs without gathering 
all facts of the case and understanding the true nature of the transaction, possibly due to an 
overwhelmed AML system. Regulated entities do this because the RBA approach is now too 
broad as compared to traditional ‘check the box’ approaches, thus they would rather err on the 
side of caution, choosing to file SARs when uncertain. On this note, Gelemerova (2011) 
suggests that it could be due the inclination to pass on risk to enforcement authorities, 
disregarding the level of suspicion and this is also echoed by Levi and Reuter (2006), but also 
add that it is one of the ways regulated entities may reduce internal review staff costs. By 
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simply filing a report without investigation, more cases within the monitoring system can be 
cleared per analyst, thus less analysts are required to be hired and trained, reducing human 
resource costs. Whichever the case, the overwhelming number of ‘empty’ reports contributes 
to the ‘Crying Wolf Effect’ where in extreme cases, the information value of reporting is 
completely diluted, eroding its use case (Takáts, 2011). 
 
1.1 Specific Aims 
It would seem then, with so much international pressure and resources dedicated towards 
enacting policies and regulations as well as perceived societal significance and attention drawn 
to the need to prevent a second coming of the September 11 attacks, that SAR levels would be 
more or less similar across countries after consideration of the size of the country, its phase of 
development, gross domestic product and amount of capital inflows and so on. However, this 
has not been the case. Indeed, we have seen varying levels of SARs even across similar 
countries. What could be the cause of this variation and is there is significant relationship 
between SAR levels and certain factors? If countries’ SAR levels are so vastly different, it is 
difficult to make any meaningful judgement as to what a high or low level of SAR count in a 
country can imply. This impedes the evaluation of each country’s AML/CFT regime, in 
particular, whether existing controls are sufficient to deter and detect money laundering 
activity. It impedes the overall goal of deterring, preventing and reducing money laundering 
activity. Thus, it is important to find relationships between SAR levels and variables that may 
affect it allowing for adjustments in existing policies or new policy interventions. Such 
adjustments and interventions will hopefully lead to the ability to draw meaningful 
conclusions from SAR levels which would serve as a first step towards a methodological and 
robust assessment of AML/CFT regimes. Indeed, current assessments of countries progress in 
their AML efforts have come under criticism for lack of a standard approach to evaluation 
(Van Duyne et al, 2018). There is a need to search and understand the determinants of SARs. 
 
The research on the determinants of SARs have mainly focused on three broad categories; the 
individual, organizational and institutional levels. At the individual level, Coombs-
Goodfellow and Lokanan (2018) made an attempt to predict the decision whether to report a 
suspicious transaction or not through the use of Jones’ issue contingent model (Jones, 1991) 
and provides evidence that suggest reporting officers will report suspicious transactions that 
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have high probability of effect, great temporal immediacy, great social consensus, and high 
concentration effect. At the organization level, there is much literature on how organizational 
factors can affect individual decision making. For example, Jones and Kavanagh (1996) found 
support through experimental design for the impact of managerial influences on individuals’ 
decision whether to act in an ethical manner or not. Managers may influence individuals to act 
in an unethical manner due to differing goals of the organization and regulators. In this respect, 
Takáts (2011) introduces the problem from a principal-agent perspective, noting the differing 
incentives and goals for the regulated entities and enforcement authorities. Regulated entities 
require client transactions and information to sustain operations, while enforcement requires 
the same entities to give up information of their clients and report suspicious clients, 
potentially freezing their activity thus forgoing revenue. In cases where entities have to decide 
between collecting fees from very large but highly risky and suspicious transactions, most 
entities will be more than willing to participate in these deals. This can be seen from typical 
high-profile money laundering cases such as the Estonian branch of Danske bank scandal 
(Bjerregaard and Kirchmaier, 2019). At the institutional level, Braun et al (2016) suggest 
several institutional features such as the states’ stability and capacity to fight corruption to 
name a few, and that among the most important features that drive numbers of STRs is the 
scope of predicate offenses in national criminal law. Moreover, sanctions for non-compliance 
with national AML/CFT legislation affect reporting levels. AML literature as well as the 
literature in other fields are brought together, to present a model where these broad categories 
(individual, organizational and institutional) can be viewed together, rather than considering 
them in silo. Further, the initiative by Braun et al (2016) to examine institutional factors 
presents an opportunity to go deeper into specific policy introductions that drive these 
reporting levels. In particular, this thesis will also investigate the uncertainty and ambiguity 
regulators face that results from the recommendation of the FATF for countries to adopt a 
‘risk-based approach’ towards anti-money laundering efforts as well as suspicious activity 
reporting. This uncertainty is driven by three main activities which concern identification of 
politically exposed persons (PEPs) and beneficial owners as well as classification of high-risk 
countries. Large fines for false negatives force the uncertain regulated entity to err on the safe 
side to report transactions even though they may seem less suspicious. In some extreme cases, 
the financial institution reports all transactions, thereby fully diluting the information value of 
reports (Takáts, 2011) and reducing the effectiveness of the SAR regime. 
 
The following research questions will therefore guide this thesis: 
 
 13 
1. What could a model that considers the individual, organizational and institutional 
determinants of SARs look like? 
 





























1.2 Thesis Structure 
The thesis will be structured accordingly: 
 
Section 1 describes the motivation, research question, as well as the scope of the research. 
 
Section 2 focuses and provides a general view of key terms and concepts surrounding money 
laundering and why money laundering prevention is important. The section will highlight the 
current use of SARs as a tool for the prevention and detection of money laundering activity as 
well as important aspects considered when reporting suspicious activity.  
 
The last part of this section will introduce the concept of the risk-based approach and mutual 
evaluations conducted by FATF and its partner institutions. 
 
Section 3 will commence with the literature review of the determinants of SARs and 
introduction of a proposed model. This section will also dive deeper into the risk-based 
approach and subsequently provide explanations for the varying levels of SARs including the 
hypothesis that will be investigated. 
 
Section 4 contains the methodological approach of this thesis. 
 
Section 5 contains a presentation of the data obtained. 
 
Section 6 presents the analysis of the data as well as presenting results from the analysis and 
also present limitations and issues identified in the thesis and methodology.  
 
Section 7 contains concluding points. 
 






This section will provide some context on what money laundering is, how illicit funds are 
typically laundered, and why it is important to identify money laundering in which there 
should be consideration for the consequences associated with money laundering. How entities 
can identify money laundering brings into the forefront the importance of suspicious activity 
reporting and hence, the concept of suspicious activity reporting will also be explored followed 
by an introduction of the risk-based approach. 
 
2.1 Money Laundering 
The act of committing a crime has an extended history. It comes in many forms and consists 
of a wide range of activities ranging from petty theft, to drugs and murder, with wide ranging 
harms to society. For example, robbery is perceived as less harmful than a murder. However, 
in general, the act of committing a crime is considered harmful, thus regulated by law, 
regardless of the scale and scope. Money laundering facilitates crime. In this sense, the crime 
may be a predicate offense that leads to money laundering. According to the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), a “predicate offence is an offence whose proceeds may 
become the subject of any of the money-laundering offences established under the 
Convention”. The 6th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (6AMLD) includes 22 predicate 
offenses for money laundering in European Union (EU) member states, for example, insider 
trading and manipulation of the market and corruption. An example of this can be the case of 
the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme, where the crime primarily involved fraud but in addition, he 
was also sentenced with eleven felony charges, three of which were related to money 
laundering (DOJ, 2009). Further, as mentioned in the previous section, the need to report 
suspicious activity stems from the need to identify transactions that involve money laundering 
which at the same time involves identifying these predicate crimes. Thus, background of 
money laundering will be provided as well. 
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2.1.1 Money Laundering – Definition 
The act of money laundering can be traced as far back to 2000 years ago when Chinese 
merchants used these techniques to channel their earnings through various businesses and 
complex financial transactions as a means to hide their income from government officials who 
sought to seize it albeit like a modern day tax (Gelemerova, 2009). Pirates have been utilizing 
laundering techniques, colluding with reputable American merchants to exchange Spanish 
pieces of eight with a currency or merchandise of choice (Madinger, 2011). What these 
examples in history show is that so long as something of value has been obtained or is being 
kept in possession illegally, there is incentive to disguise its origin. Since then, these 
techniques have been used across the globe, quite notably by American gangsters (Sullivan, 
2015) such as ‘Al Capone’ who is said to have bought laundromats to funnel dirty money from 
activities like prostitution and comingle them with legitimate income from the business. 
However, it was only during the Watergate scandal that the first sighting of the term money 
laundering appeared and was used (Gelemerova, 2009; 2011). It was used in a judicial context 
in 1982 in the case US v $4,255, 625.39 (1982) 551 F Supp 314, and it subsequently spread 
worldwide. The Watergate scandal is a significant event in history as it brought to light the 
concept of money laundering and the fact that even politicians and government agencies can 
be involved. It exposed high-level political corruption which implicated even the CIA. 
Since then, many researchers, government organizations such as the UN, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), EU, FATF just to name a few, and private institutions have attempted 
at formal definitions of money laundering. Sullivan (2015) defines money laundering as “the 
practice of integrating the proceeds of criminal enterprises into the legitimate mainstream of 
the financial community”. Madinger (2011) describes it as “the use of money derived from 
illegal activity by concealing the identity of the individuals who obtained the money and 
converting it to assets that appear to have come from a legitimate source”. Chong and Lopez 
(2015) describe money laundering as an attempt by launderers to legitimize the proceeds of 
illegal activities while maintaining the value of acquired assets. They go on to suggest that the 
process requires the intervention of some financial institution. The FATF describes money 
laundering as the process of disguising the illegal origin of criminal proceeds by individuals 
or groups who seek to enjoy the gains from these illegal activities without exposing the source. 
What can be concluded is that the function of money laundering is to ultimately present a false 
appearance of legitimacy of money or property obtained illegally or through illegal means.  
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2.1.2 Stages of Money Laundering  
Money laundering can be thought of as a complex puzzle. One may fit two or three pieces 
together and yet the picture remains unclear. The picture slowly starts to reveal itself only as 
more pieces are put together. However, like the puzzle pieces, it is often difficult to link 
separate transactions together to uncover the underlying money laundering scheme due to the 
many complex transactions that the launderer can make to conceal his or her trace. This allows 
the launderer to hide behind the complexity, in essence, becoming a needle in a haystack. 
Given this complexity, one would be led to think that the process of money laundering is a 
dynamic and ever-changing one. However, most literature and even the FATF describe the 
process as occurring in three stages. The first stage, known as ‘placement’, is the introduction 
of assets or wealth obtained from illegal activity into some financial system either physically 
or through electronic means. For example, the launderer might deposit a sum of money just 
under the reporting threshold in a financial institution. Others might hire several individuals 
(money mules) to deposit a large sum of money in smaller amounts. This process could also 
be accomplished by buying foreign currency using the illegally obtained money. 
The second stage is known as the ‘layering’ stage and it describes the process of separating 
the illicit proceeds from their source by adding complexity through layers of financial 
transactions to ultimately conceal the origin of illicit funds. Examples of layering include using 
shell companies, special purpose vehicles (SPV), special purpose entities (SPE), trusts to name 
a few, all of which can be used to hide the identity of the ultimate beneficial owner. Techniques 
can even be used in combination, where funds are wired through multiple accounts and 
eventually end up in a shell company or SPV with no connection to any natural person. 
When illegally obtained money reaches a point where it cycles back and integrates with the 
legitimate economy through seemingly legitimate business or personal transactions, the 
money laundering process is completed. The illegal origin of funds has successfully been 
concealed or disguised. This stage of the money laundering process is known as the integration 
stage. The launderer, for instance, might choose to integrate these funds through investment 
in real estate, art, high-value products or even mom and pop stores. By this stage, it is 
exceedingly difficult to distinguish between legal and illegal wealth. Thus, it is increasingly 
important that suspicious activity is identified and reported before completion of this stage.  
It should be noted that these three stages only provide a basic view in which money may be 
laundered, but there are many ways that criminals can choose to launder their money 
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(Gelemerova, 2011), some of it may be quite complex. However, the three-stage model 
provides a basic understanding of the money laundering process and certainly useful for 
building more complex models. 
 
2.1.3 Consequences of money laundering  
The use of suspicious activity reports and the amount of resources dedicated to it cannot really 
be justified unless the consequences of undetected money laundering can be identified. The 
FATF and many others believe that undetected money laundering leads to increased exposure 
of the society to organized crime and corruption, the undermining of the legitimate private 
sector, dampening effects on foreign investment, distortions in policies, disruption to 
economic growth and stability and thus presents a cost to society. Success in money laundering 
means that detection of the predicate offence, and the identification of the offender, become 
more difficult (Mackrell, 1996) and reduces the probability of being caught. Indeed, when 
crime goes unpunished, criminals are incentivised to continue their schemes or even expand 
the scale and scope of the crime. This may permeate the cycle of crime as there may be an 
increased need to bribe public officials or lawyers to continue hiding the crime. Ferwerda 
(2009) provides empirical evidence to suggest that anti-money laundering policy can be used 
to reduce crime levels in line with the idea that the marginal utility of crime can be reduced 
through money laundering controls. 
Money launderers may use front companies, that is, companies that engage in legitimate 
business but are potentially controlled by criminals. These criminals aim to hide the source of 
illegal funds by combining it with legitimate funds obtained through the legal operations of 
the front company. These front companies have a competitive advantage over legitimate firms 
(Unger et al., 2006) as their access to illegal funds allows them to subsidize products and 
services that completely undercuts the market, distorting competition. The extent of money 
laundering in a country may affect foreign investments as countries’ reputation as well as those 
of its financial institutions and businesses are integral for foreign investors to feel that their 
investment can remain intact and safe in a stable environment. This reputation could be 
tarnished by criminal infiltration thus affecting the overall performance and safety of the 
economy (Mackrell, 1996; Boorman and Ingves, 2001). Extensive money laundering may also 
lead to misleading economic data resulting in policies enacted with the best of intentions but 
failing to achieve its intended effect. In some cases, such mis-directed policies can even have 
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harmful effects, hurting those it aimed to help. Not to mention, the overall political stability 
and integrity of a state can be affected and ultimately destabilised by the introduction of 
criminal assets (Mackrell, 1996). Further, this may be more of a possibility for smaller 
economies. It may also lead to economic instability as the sudden influx of cross-border fund 
transfers could introduce erratic movements in exchange and interest rates (McDowell and 
Novis, 2001). 
Finally, and probably most importantly are the impacts to society. Van Duyne and Soudjin 
(2010) concluded that the most important influence of undetected money laundering is rather 
of a social nature which could involve showing off wealth obtained by unfair means thus 
eroding citizens faith in fair outcomes, inducing them to crime for profit. Indeed, with the case 
of 1MDB, one of the suspects in question, Jho Low allegedly lived a life of luxury through 
siphoning billions of taxpayer dollars from the national fund into his own personal accounts 
and till this day has not been apprehended. This furthers eroding the notion that “Crime does 
not pay”. When crime does pay, it creates incentives and opportunities for others to engage in 
unlawful activity, adding fuel to the problems mentioned above. Thus, we see why it is so 
important to be able to first identify these activities and secondly have avenues to report them. 
When the effectiveness of the reporting regime is in question, we should investigate why. 
 
2.2 Suspicious Activity Reports 
In order to capture money laundering activity within the three-stage process and to aid 
reduction of harm to the economy and society, a SAR regime has been imposed by 
governments on regulated entities. As pointed out in Section 1, of the 40 + 9 recommendations 
(9 related to terrorist financing) provided by the FATF, recommendation 20 involves 
suspicious transaction/activity reporting which requires regulated entities report to the 
appropriate Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) when they suspect or have reasonable grounds 
to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity. There two forms of reporting, the 
first is the objective form where a report is mandated when a transaction exceeds a certain 
amount. This is the CTR requirement that has been mentioned in Section 1. The second is the 
subjective form where individuals are supposed to exercise judgement as to which transactions 
may be constituted as suspicious. To incentivise reporting such suspicious activity, the entities 
and the employees reporting such suspicions are protected from liability and should be 
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prohibited from disclosing that they have reported such activity. According to Morrison (1995) 
such regulations are the most important weapon in the fight against money laundering. The 
objective of the regime from identification of the customer to monitoring the transactions is to 
obtain information and eventually deduce any incidences of money laundering and terrorist 
financing and to finally report them to the FIU. The filing of such information supplies more 
help to the process of investigation by those entrusted with such duties (Truman and Reuter, 
2004).  
Through suspicious activity reporting and mandating the industry to report them (FATF 2003; 
2012) policy makers believed that this would allow for those closest to potential suspicious 
activity involving money laundering or terrorist financing to promptly report and provide 
material information in the hopes law enforcement may respond to potential threats as soon as 
possible (Stalcup, 2015). By filing a SAR, enforcement authorities and investigators either 
have the judiciary power to demand an institution to freeze the assets or contact relevant 
authorities who have such judiciary capacity. 
 
2.2.1 A typical SAR process 
A SAR can typically occur in two ways. The first is when the transaction monitoring system 
deployed by the regulated entity triggers an alert based on a transaction or a set of transactions 
which meet certain criteria as designed by the administrators of the system. An example of 
such criteria that could pick up large cash transactions, which is a money laundering red flag, 
could be “a wire transfer that is equal or above $10,000”. To pick up structuring, a criterion 
could be set up such that an alert is triggered in the system when “Three wire transfers 
amounting to or exceeds $10,000” or “10 wire transfers under 1000 and aggregates to 
$10,000”. These alerts would then stay in the system until a trained specialist employed by the 
institution starts investigating the alert. The specialist will consider factors such as the account 
transaction history, purpose of the account, who the owner of the account is and so on. If the 
specialist deems the transaction suspicious, he/she can move the alert to the second level 
investigator who most often is more senior and has more experience to draw knowledge from. 
This senior investigator should have a better understanding of the nuances and subtleties 
concerning suspicious activities. It is the hope that at this level, the information gathered will 
be enough to dismiss the alert as a negative. However, if suspicions are unable to be quelled 
by the available information, the investigator should start to compile the necessary documents 
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and prepare to file a SAR. The process may vary and, in some organizations, the duty to file 
SARs falls under the purview of the Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO). In such 
setups, the second level investigator will compile all documents and escalate the case to the 
MLRO for further review and action (Kloostra et al., 2009). 
In the second instance, the suspicious activity might be picked up by a front-line employee 
who interacts with a client, either through name screening or picking up suspicious behaviour 
as part of the KYC process. The process to begin preliminary investigations varies across 
organizations however, in general, a case should be created in the AML system manually by 
the client-facing employee. This is because it is not possible that the system may pick up 
suspicious activity since the transaction was in person. Once the alert is manually created in 
the system, the junior specialist will pick up on the alert and work with the employee to 
understand and gather the facts of the case. 
 
2.2.2 Defensive reporting and theory of Crying Wolf 
As described, the SAR process seems rather systematic, but SARs are of variable quality. 
Sometimes regulated entities file reports primarily to protect themselves against fines from 
potentially violating reporting requirements, with little focus on assisting enforcement 
authorities or stopping crime. This is what is known as defensive reporting, where financial 
institutions file SARs without understanding the true nature of the transaction and gathering 
the facts of the case, disregarding the level of suspicion. These actions form a defensive gesture 
or ‘de-risking’ strategy to shift the risk to enforcement, in an attempt to avoid potential fines 
and possibly reduce costs, rather than commit to proper investigation (Levi and Reuter, 2006). 
As a result, law enforcement, in particular, financial intelligence units (FIUs) are overloaded 
with an excessive number of filings that they have to go through, leading to inefficient 
outcomes if the reports will ultimately be dismissed as false positives.  
This leads to what Takáts (2011) terms as the ‘Crying Wolf’ phenomenon. The term borrows 
much of the intuition from the children’s fable ‘The Boy Who Cried Wolf”. Like the shepherd 
boy in the story who lied about wolf sightings and tired out villagers to the point where his 
subsequent call for help lost credibility and was ignored, eventually losing his flock to a real 
wolf, ‘Crying Wolf’ can arise because excessively high fines for false negatives force the 
uncertain bank to err on the safe side and report transactions which are not really suspicious. 
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In some extreme cases the financial institution reports all transactions, thereby fully diluting 
the information value of reports (ibid). The factors highlighted in the above sections point to 
evidence of the many facets of the SAR process. If banks and other regulated firms feel a 
greater need to protect themselves against government sanctions by filing reports, the increase 
in numbers may not indicate improved diligence or effectiveness of the greater AML regime. 
Indeed, many researchers such as Chaikin (2009) call into question the effectiveness of SAR 
regimes. 
Demetis and Angell (2007) also highlight the effect of this self-defensive action as passing the 
risk to the regulator. In various annual reports the FATF condemns defensive reporting. As 
added by Johnston and Carrington (2006), defensive reporting hampers the effectiveness of 
the analysis and investigation of cases that deserve the most attention. 
 
2.3 Politically exposed persons and beneficial owners 
Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) are individuals who hold a significant position in 
government or public office. They present a higher risk of money laundering because of their 
position and authority within their jurisdiction. Some are also directly responsible for and have 
access to state funds. As a result, regulated entities typically categorise these individuals and 
their close associates as high risk. In addition, companies owned by PEPs are also considered 
risky and placed in a high-risk bucket. Formally, the third EU directive defined PEPs as 
“natural persons who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions and 
immediate family members, or persons known to be close associates, of such persons”. This 
definition is central to the problems and challenges associated with suspicious activity 
reporting and the effectiveness of the SAR regime which will be elaborated in the further 
sections. 
Beneficial owners are natural persons who have ultimate control over a legal person or 
arrangement such as an insurance policy or a company, investment vehicle or SPV. It is 
important to understand who the ultimate beneficial owners are as it is known that launderers 
use several front or shell companies to hide ownership and use these companies to channel 
funds for personal gain. 
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2.4 High/Low Risk Countries 
The FATF classifies high risk countries as those that display “significant strategic deficiencies 
in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of 
proliferation” (FATF, 2007). It further calls on all jurisdictions who are members of the FATF 
(nearly all countries) to apply enhanced due diligence (EDD) for these countries and highlights 
the increased risk that countries may face when dealing with them. However, these countries 
are not sanctioned, in the sense that dealing with these countries is not prohibited but subject 
to the need for more extensive checks. This has implications for how the risk-based approach 
is handled which will be discussed in greater detail in the later sections. 
 
2.5 Risk-based approach 
The risk-based approach was introduced in 2003 by the FATF and primarily was aimed at 
addressing the problem of increasing SAR levels (Ross and Hannan, 2007). One of the main 
pain points identified in the initial rule-based approach was that it did not allow regulated 
entities flexibility to utilize strategies to curb money laundering that best fits existing resources 
and capabilities (Ai et al., 2010). This increases the cost of implementing AML controls due 
to the need to search for and hire qualified individuals as well as change existing organizational 
and system infrastructure. In some cases, it could be inefficient as the rule-based approach was 
based on checking off boxes without consideration of the specific risks that the institutions 
face. Indeed, the FATF mentions, a risk-based approach “encompasses recognising the 
existence of the risk(s), undertaking an assessment of the risk(s) and developing strategies to 
manage and mitigate the identified risks” (FATF, 2007). This was further echoed by the Third 
EU Directive which stated that “Countries should identify, assess, and understand the money 
laundering and terrorist financing risks for the country” and requires enhanced due diligence 
(EDD) of customers in situations where regulated entities find themselves interacting with 
clients or handling transactions with a higher risk of money laundering and/or terrorist 
financing. It was the belief and hope of policy makers that applying a risk-based approach will 
result in a reduction of poor-quality reports (and total volume) by reporting institutions thus 
improving the quality of intelligence provided to FIUs. 
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3. Literature and Theory 
The risk-based approach although proposed as a solution to the rising SAR levels and 
subsequent pressure on enforcement authorities, brings with it a set of challenges. For 
example, what does it mean to identify a politically exposed person or a beneficial owner? 
How far down the relationship hierarchy does an investigator need to uncover? What does it 
mean to be a high-risk country? A country like the United States which has a high-risk of 
money laundering is not treated in the same way as an island nation like Malta. Certainly, there 
is much ambiguity and uncertainty with regards to how these activities are carried out vis a 
vis a risk-based approach. And thus, I investigate if there is a relationship between the risk-
based approach and SAR levels. However, in the first part of this section, concepts from other 
fields of study as well as those within the AML context are brought together. A model where 
these concepts can be viewed together is proposed.  
 
3.1 Individual determinants 
Individuals face infinite stimuli from the external environment. To be able to process huge 
amounts of information, the human cognition contains a set of filters of which information 
passes through. According to March and Herbert (1958), each decision maker brings his or 
her own set of "givens" to a situation requiring assessment and decision. These givens reflect 
the decision maker's cognitive base: knowledge or assumptions about future events, 
knowledge of alternatives, knowledge of consequences attached to alternatives. They also 
reflect his or her values: principles for ordering consequences or alternatives. The individual’s 
eventual perception of the situation combines with his/her values to provide the basis for 










Further, Kahneman and Tversky (2013) posit that individuals make decisions based on a vision 
of utility that is distorted based on risk aversion and fear of loss. Also, they further suggest 
that how a situation is presented can affect the ultimate decision taken for the decision maker 
(ibid). This forms the cognitive base. This is not to suggest that individuals do not actively try 
to make the best decision as with utility theory, but rather, the vision of what is best is 
constrained by the information available and how it is presented and interpreted. The various 
determinants that may affect a cognitive base of an individual can be many, including 
contextual factors such as age, experience, education, financial position, socioeconomic roots 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  
Where values and morals are concerned, Jones (1991) proposed a model which conceptualized 
moral intensity as a multi-dimensional construct comprised of six characteristics of an ethical 
issue that decision makers incorporate into their ethical decision-making process. The six 
dimensions include, magnitude of consequences, social consensus, probability of effect, 
temporal immediacy, proximity and concentration of effect (ibid). Indeed, Coombs-
Goodfellow and Lokanan (2018) tested these components from an AML standpoint and found 
evidence that supports these dimensions through interviews with compliance officers in 
Jersey, except for magnitude of consequences and proximity. In particular, they found large 
support for social consensus through their interviews with compliance officers who were part 
of their study. For the officers to act and make a decision of whether to submit a SAR on a 
potential but unclear suspicious activity, they needed to have consensus among their peers, 
supervisors, management and relevant stakeholders that this was the right course of action to 
take (Barnett and Valentine, 2004). In fact, the lack of social consensus on this issue can create 
difficulties between the officers and their interaction with key stakeholders in the AML 
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3.2 Organizational determinants 
Economic conditions, scarcity of resources (Stead et al., 1990), competition (Hegarty and 
Sims, 1978), managerial influences (Jones and Kavanagh, 1996), organizational orientation 
and corporate policies (Hegarty and Sims, 1979),  responsibility for consequences (Trevino, 
1986),  and stakeholders (Hunt and Vitell, 1986) are the proposed organizational influences 
from the literature and this may be applied towards SAR filing by individuals. 
These organizational factors can be used as a starting point and can be linked to one another. 
From a SAR perspective, the economic and financial situation of a company as well as the 
level of competition makes sense intuitively. As investors who provide capital to the company 
view the role of an organization as a conduit to maximise their profits (Friedman, 2007), the 
orientation and corporate policy of an organization may be steered into the direction of profits 
at any cost. Resources dedicated to money laundering and compliance in general may be very 
limited. Araujo (2010) shows that compliance costs are dependent on the probability of getting 
caught and the size of the fine should this eventualise. Firms which seek to maximise profits 
will commit to AML systems and controls up until the costs of their implementation equals 
the costs arising from fines due to non-compliance. This can affect the quality and quantity of 
the investigators hired. Investigators may be burdened with huge backlogs due to shortage in 
staffing and those hired may have varied qualifications. As a result, investigators may gloss 
over transactions quickly, only looking for obvious red flags without going deeper. In this 
sense, the organization shapes the cognitive base of the individual. Additionally, in the 
presence of competition, it might be advantageous to have measures that simply ‘window-
dress’ without the true intention of deterring and detecting such suspicious activity. This may 
further affect the corporate culture and group ideals, leading employees to condone suspicious 
transactions that they are supposed to investigate. If investigators are rewarded for bypassing 
certain questionable transactions and are not themselves subject to punishment, a certain 
culture within the organization will develop. A willing and honest investigator may be 
influenced to follow the ‘status quo’ because of the need for social consensus.  
Further, financial struggles will affect the amount of training and infrastructure in place that 
can aid investigators with their duties. Any form of capital inflow will feel like a godsend. 
Management may try to influence or exert pressure on the employee to overlook questionable 
but highly profitable transactions which indicates that managerial influences play role 
especially when it comes to cases that are in the greyzone. Some may even promise a 
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promotion for a ‘job well done’. Stakeholders within the organization play a role as well. The 
compliance officers interviewed by Coombs-Goodfellow and Lokanan (2018) alluded that 
“various stakeholders can get irritated when activities such as transactions or deals are delayed 
because of AML requirements such as customer due diligence (CDD) etc.” These will lead to 






Figure 2: Organizational determinants 
 
3.3 Institutional determinants 
Institutional theory has risen to prominence as a popular and powerful explanation for both 
individual and organizational action (Dacin et al., 2002). As Meyer and Rowan (1977) put 
“Institutionalization involves the processes by which social processes, obligations, or 
actualities come to take on a rule-like status in social thought and action”. In this regard, 
individuals who want to take part in society have to fall under the organizations’ rules and 
social processes, in which these organizations then follow the rules that institutions set. 
Certainly, as explained in the previous sections, there may be micro differences within 
categories be it at the individual or organization level, however, the decision making is 
ultimately confined by the boundaries or ‘playing field’ set at the institution level. This is not 
to suggest that individuals or organizations take the reality of the institutions as real or for 
granted, but because both are most of the time rewarded for doing so, it creates an incentive 
for conformation. The FATF is an institution, and in this regard, sets the rules, and 
rewards/punishes those that do not follow. However, the ambiguity and uncertainty regarding 
these rules, in particular the RBA, have led to much variation within SAR levels across 
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Ultimately the organization that decides not to comply with the rules of the game within the 
institution will eventually be kicked out. In the context of AML, the FATF have established 
the rules of the game through their 40 recommendations (supported by hard laws enacted by 
member states) and developed a membership structure, where if a country is not found to 
comply, they are ‘blacklisted’. Which was what they did in 1998 through the Non-Cooperative 
Countries and Territories (NCCT) initiative. Even though it was shorty abolished after much 
criticism, the FATF still maintains a membership structure and the ‘blacklist’ is still used 
externally. Unfortunately, the rules governing the game can sometimes be too broad. This is 
understandable because having too narrow rules and regulations mean that certain negative 
behaviour may go unpunished. However, this also leads to much uncertainty and ambiguity. 
Perhaps the most obvious indication of how a policy or change in policy may influence 
organizational behaviour is one of the deregulation of the banking sector in the United States. 
Commercial banks started to engage in dangerous investment activities such as securities 
trading after the repeal of the Glass Steagall Act. Even though it was not a rule that mandated 
banks to engage in investment activities but because it was profitable to do so, and there no 
longer was a rule preventing them from doing it, the banks started to engage in such activities. 
The same can be applied to the organizations with regards to SAR rules and regulations. As 
long as these are too broad or too narrow, it sets the tone for what organizations ultimately can 
do, which is to work in a way that maximizes shareholder value. 
 
3.3.2 Economic performance 
The financial sector is integral in any form of economy. Financial institutions offer capital to 
individuals and business owners for them to grow their businesses and increase economic 
activity. The cycle continues when businesses start to expand and grow, and foreign investors 
start injecting capital into the financial system. Economic activity also includes fraudulent 
activity and therefore as the economy grows, one would expect that there will be more 
financial transactions which increases the probability of illicit activity. This potentially 
increases the amount of suspicious transactions reported. As Braun et al (2016) suggests, the 
larger size of the financial sector may trigger more SARs.  
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Another determinant that is closely linked to financial sector size is the size of the GDP. As 
income levels rise, more money is spent. As more money is spent by individuals on goods and 
services provided by businesses, this creates the need to grow business activity to support 
consumer demand and a subsequent need to increase financial activity for businesses, either 
to support activity in overseas expansions or to build infrastructure locally. Increasing 
financial activity increases the probability of suspicious transactions which contributes to SAR 
levels. 
 
3.3.3 Government effectiveness 
A state’s stability and efficiency of its public institutions in particular that of anti-corruption 
enforcement and the size of the shadow economy are likely determinants of suspicious activity 
levels though whether or not the effect of each leads to more or less SARs is unclear. A state 
with high levels of corruption within its public officials for example may increase the need to 
for them to launder the money to hide its illicit origins. For instance, Rottig et al., (2016) argue 
that institution building in emerging economies is vital in fighting corruption, and 
Vaithilingam & Nair (2007) find less money laundering activity in countries with strong 
institutional capacity, effective legal and regulatory frameworks, and efficient governance 
structures. However, officials may be so corrupt that there is no actual need to launder the 
money. In crony capitalistic states, financial institutions may be colluding with corrupt 
officials (Enderwick, 2005) or politically connected firms (Diwan and Schiffbauer, 2018) for 
private gain. As such, one can see why a state which allows its citizens to hold governments 
accountable through the process of elections is important to maintaining a corrupt free 












3.4 Conceptual Model 
As part of the first research question: What could a model that considers the individual, 
organizational and institutional determinants of SARs look like, a conceptual model captured 
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3.5 Hypothesis development – Risk-based approach 
Building on what was presented above, in this second part, a hypothesis will be presented 
regarding a specific policy recommendation, in particular, the risk-based approach 
recommended by the FATF. In essence, the challenges surrounding identification of PEPs, 
beneficial owners as well as risk categorization of countries lead to much ambiguity and 
uncertainty regarding the interpretation and implementation of this particular 
recommendation. Thus, one might question whether there is a relationship between how 
closely countries follow the risk-based approach and SAR levels. 
Under the risk-based approach, those responsible for a firms’ AML controls, oftentimes 
compliance managers, should assess the business and identify the riskiest activities and 
allocate the appropriate number of resources towards monitoring these risks, commensurate 
to the risk level. However, in order to determine this understanding, there is an assumption 
that the assessor possesses superior knowledge of the country on one hand but also an 
understanding of the evaluators’ (FATF) point of view of what is ‘correct’. A manager 
entrusted with this task may think that he/she has covered all the risks only to find that his/her 
understanding of the risk was different than that of the evaluators and gets penalized for 
‘inadequate controls’. Even worse, a transaction may have passed that should have been 
flagged but was not, due to this sort of ‘risk tiering’, leading to heavy fines. This approach, 
which starts from the government level, down to non-financial sectors and professions, with 
so many unresolved questions, leaves the door open to subjectivity and arbitrariness. Indeed, 
(de Koker, 2009; Ross & Hannan, 2007) point out that AML risk is not well defined and allows 
discretion for each country, from the top at the institutional level to the organization and the 
individual to decide what those risks are.  
 
3.5.1 Challenges regarding the RBA 
The introduction of the risk-based approach was well intentioned. Certainly, there will be 
present some risks that are specific only to certain countries and these can be based on the 
size, geolocation and natural resources available to the country just to name a few indicators. 
However, this approach faces three challenges. The first concerns the identification of PEPs. 
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The second concerns the classification of high/low risk countries and thirdly, the identification 
of beneficial owners. 
 
Identification of PEPs 
The identification of PEPs requires going in-depth into the personal details of the PEP as well 
as his/her family members and close associates. However, the question regarding how deep of 
an enquiry is required of a PEP’s family and close relationships remains. The recommendation 
simply defines PEPs as “individuals who are, or have been, entrusted with prominent public 
functions and their family members and close associates”, and includes both domestic and 
foreign PEPs. This suggests that the extent of probing and acquiring information is completely 
up to the discretion of financial institutions. Person A could be the distant cousin of Person B 
who is the daughter of Person C whose uncle is a known PEP. Astute entities will flag Person 
A as high risk. Some will stop investigation at person C, flag them as high risk, and in essence 
will still be in line with the recommendations of FATF. Some might only consider immediate 
family members of the PEP and will not even flag Person C. When a transaction originates 
from Person A, if it was flagged as high risk, investigators might take a closer look and 
subsequently report a suspicious activity, however, if Person A was not initially flagged as 
high risk, investigators most certainly will not take a second look. As can be seen, in these 
scenarios, institutions follow the same recommendations but have very different outcomes. 
Further, some individuals can continue to be regarded as PEPs even after they have stepped 
away from their role for a period of time (Gelemerova et al, 2018). It could be one or two 
years, but this practice varies across entities. Indeed, some former politicians may have 
businesses and the risk is that former politicians often maintain relationships with current 
politicians as a way of guaranteeing support for their own interests. However, this creates 
further confusion for entities when deciding which of their clients should be or continue to be 
categorized as PEPs. 
 
High risk countries 
High risk countries are typically described as countries which pose great money laundering 
concern. However, as highlighted by Gelemerova et al. (2018), regulated entities face 
tremendous difficulty with how to handle clients or transactions from high risk countries due 
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to the focus of regulators on the country itself rather than the case associated with a particular 
client or transaction. This means that clients are handled according to the risk classification of 
their country and its reputation rather than an assessment based on their conduct. Indeed, 
Ryder and Turksen (2013) raised a similar issue about the ethics of such an approach when 
one might look at a client from a ‘high risk’ country and allocate more time to investigation 
as compared to a client from a low risk country when the transaction details may be the 
identical. None is really riskier or more suspicious than the other. The difficulty increases 
when reporting suspicious transactions expanded to include financing to terrorists after the 
events of September 11. Not only are reporting institutions required to identify potentially 
suspicious activity in a transaction or within a set of transactions, they now also need to 
identify clean money used for terrorist financing. In addition, regulated entities also search 
local and international lists to find out whether names of customers or potential partners appear 
on these lists as a form of due diligence. However, it is not clear what appearing on these lists 
mean for regulated entities and their clients or partners. They are left wondering what they 
should do and how they may proceed (Gelemerova et al., 2018). Should regulated entities 
simply just highlight the transaction as suspicious when it comes from these countries, what 
is known as de-risking, or should they continue, and risk punishment if it should indeed be 
part of a money laundering scheme? This represents a dilemma for most reporting entities and 
different entities will take different approaches. 
Also, these classifications of countries may also be arbitrary (Sharman, 2008). Other than 
sanctioned countries which is quite clear that one cannot have any relationship with, the 
criteria for designating a country as high risk of money laundering is not clear. In contrast, 
countries with fewer incidents of money laundering, might be considered high risk due to 
negativity surrounding its institutional controls. An example that is worth mentioning is 
Estonia, which is ranked on the Basel AML index as one of the lowest countries in terms of 
ML risk but is embroiled in one of the largest money laundering scandals concerning Danske 
bank and its Estonian branch (Bjerregaard and Kirchmaier, 2019). 
The guidance from FATF does not suggest prohibiting institutions from getting involved in 
high-risk situations. They may do so only as long as they have the right risk-mitigating 
strategies in place. However, how many shades of grey are between low and high risk and how 




The first two challenges lead into the challenge of identifying beneficial owners. In this regard, 
the Third EU Directive provides more guidance regarding ownership, specifying that a bank 
may not need to consider ownership if no shareholder owns over 25% regardless of their 
jurisdiction (some banks have decreased this to 10% due to the FATCA requirement to identify 
US persons holding an interest of 10% or greater). However, as an example to describe the 
problem, if five individuals each own a 20% stake, this may be overlooked unless, in 
legislation and organization policies, it is explicitly stated that ownership has to be established, 
regardless of jurisdiction, industry, product or percentage share. 20% is a large stake to 
possess; sometimes a stake as low as 10% or even 5% can determine and influence 
considerable financial benefits. This lends into the issue of simplified (SDD) and enhanced 
due diligence (EDD). EDD is required when a client falls into the high-risk category which 
has been reviewed quite extensively and a reporting entity is required investigate in more detail 
certain aspects. However, the problem is that neither the EU nor domestic legislators have 
made clear exactly what: (i) identifying the owner,  (ii) documenting one’s understanding of 
ownership, (iii) obtaining documentary evidence of identity (e.g. copies of passports, proof of 
address of owners, directors), (iv) conducting searches for adverse news, (v) or all in 
combination, actually mean. 
 
How does it compare with SDD? Does SDD mean that there is no need to perform the above? 
However, even if an entity is viewed as low risk, these basic information should be obtained. 
Not obtaining such basic identifiable information would simply be negligent. 
 
Overall interpretations of risk 
The interpretations of risk revolve around different activities such as identification of PEPs, 
beneficial owners and risk categorization of countries, but the questions that assessors have to 
ask themselves are more or less similar. There may be clients on the border of high, medium 
or low risk and thus what are the objectifiable criteria to classify a PEP as high risk instead of 
medium risk? Managers are left on their own with regards to this dilemma. For example, if a 
client is on the border between high and medium risk, and eventually rated medium, an 
appointed evaluator can argue that the client should have been placed in the high-risk category 
and that the regulated firm’s process is lacking. The manager may present facts to the evaluator 
that support their decision such as the client’s clean record but, because the client came from 
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a high-risk country or was a distant relative of a PEP, and was not highlighted, the manager 
and the organization will be faulted. The evaluator is looking for the ‘right level of controls’. 
As there are no clear definitions and objective criteria of what a right process or right level of 
controls are, managers are left to interpret and go through a process of guesswork. Indeed, 
firms as a result go through a process of trial and error through the evaluation process in the 
absence of clear guidance and benchmarks as to what represents a sufficient and efficient 
AML/CFT programme (Gelemerova et al., 2018). 
This presents a problem not only across countries and sectors but also within specific entities 
as risks may be viewed differently by the various departments of that entity. Even where 
reporting entities are always on the alert and are highly committed and able to spot risks, they 
face problems when trying to decide whether these risks necessarily require EDD and/or filing 
a report. Institutions need to know exactly what high risk is. This implies that a risk-threshold 
has to be operationalised. However, financial services offered in the modern era involves 
parties from different sectors, industries and jurisdictions and each has a different 
interpretation of risk. Thus, just elaborating on the risk definition is unlikely to alleviate the 
burden of the regulated entities without any further effort in standardising compliance 
practices and the necessary resources across countries. 
This is not to advocate for a one size fits all approach, indeed, different situations call for 
different remedies. However, rules should be made clearer and the attitude towards 
compliance, and more importantly, towards the execution of compliance measures, requires a 
higher level of consistency across countries and sector. 
Thus, with the above review in place, and the understanding of the risk-based approach as 
increasing the ambiguity and uncertainty of those who are required to report suspicious 
activity, the hypothesis that this paper will investigate follows in the below section. 
 
3.6 Hypothesis 
As it stands, the RBA is not achieving the intended effect on SAR levels. SAR levels have 
continued to rise since 2013 when the RBA was first introduced. This begs the question 
whether there is relationship between how closely countries adopt the RBA and SAR levels? 
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If there is, what is the extent of its impact? If there is not, would it be better if the RBA was 
abolished? With that in mind, the hypothesis is presented below: 
 
H0: There is no relationship between how closely countries adopt a risk-based approach and 
suspicious activity reporting levels.  
 
It is the expectation, that this hypothesis will be rejected due to the fact that: 
 
• The risk-based approach was introduced in 2013 to reduce the rising SAR levels and 
pressure on enforcement authorities and related resources but SAR levels continued to 
rise. 
 
• The ambiguity and uncertainty regarding the application of the risk-based approach 
around 3 activities; (i) identification of PEPs (ii) identification of beneficial owners 
(iii) risk categorization of countries. 
 
• Occurrence of defensive reporting due to the inclination to rather err on the side of 
caution when faced with ambiguous scenarios with regards to what exactly is 
suspicious as well as what evaluators deem as suspicious. 
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4. Methodology 
So far, what was done in this thesis has been to consolidate from the AML literature and 
relevant research areas, the possible determinants of suspicious activity reports. Then, a 
conceptual model, where it is proposed that decisions at the institutional level shape the 
boundaries of what organizations and subsequently individuals can make at their own levels, 
was provided. The risk-based approach and its potential impact on suspicious activity 
reporting was further explored. Specifically, a null hypothesis that there is no relationship 
between how closely countries adopt a risk-based approach and suspicious activity reporting 
levels was suggested.  Based on the evaluation of the literature, the expectation is to reject the 
hypothesis, however this needs to be supported empirically which is the focus of this section. 
A regression analysis (OLS/RE) is applied to see if the hypothesis will be rejected or not. To 
understand if countries follow a risk-based approach more or less closely, the mutual 
evaluation reports (MER) conducted by the FATF and the countries of which are its members, 
were made use of. These reports provide a rating for compliance with the 40 recommendations. 
It is also recognized that there may be variables not included in the model that have 
relationships with the explanatory variable and impact the level of SARs thus the model 
includes these variables as a form of control. 
 
4.1 Dependent Variable 
Firstly, the main variable of interest is the suspicious reporting levels of individual countries. 
There is no publicly accessible central database that contains SAR data for different countries. 
Therefore, annual reports of each country’s designated FIU for a minimum of 5 years from the 
year 2015 to 2019 were used to find the required data. Further, where the report was not 
available in English, google translate was used to identify the terms “suspicious”, “suspicious 
activity”, “suspicious transaction”, “performance”, “statistics” in the native language in order 
to locate where the relevant statistic was in the report. Where the report was not available, the 
relevant FIU was contacted. In cases where there were both no updated/accessible annual 
reports and no response from the FIU, the country was not selected for this research. Further, 
it was made sure that countries from different regions and sizes were represented so as to 
ensure that the end result was not biased to a distinct type of country characteristic. 
 38
4.2 Mutual Evaluation Ratings - Independent Variable 
The ratings provided by the FATF during the mutual evaluations is used as an independent 
variable. Such reports provide the inputs for a dataset on how countries perform with respect 
to their commitments to the FATF recommendations. It contains an assessment from FATF 
appointed evaluators (experts from member countries) on other members’ adherence to the 40 
+ 9 recommendations. In essence, it is similar to a peer review. Countries are measured on the 
basis of effectiveness and technical compliance to the recommendations. For the technical 
review, of which the analysis is based on, countries are evaluated according to relevant laws 
and regulations with regards to prevention of abuse by criminals of the financial system 
(FATF, 2013). Based on the evaluation, countries are then provided with an initial rating, 
(Non-compliant [NC], Partially compliant [PC], Largely compliant [LC], Compliant [C]) that 
measures compliance on each of the 40 recommendations of the FATF. Of particular interest 
for this study, recommendation 1 (R.1) which involves the use of the risk-based approach is 
of relevance. In order to further quantify and properly measure the effect of ratings from the 
MER, a number is provided to represent each category of rating and this is similar to Unger 
and Ferwerda (2008). 
 
1) Non-compliant (NC) = 1 
2) Partially compliant (PC) = 2 
3) Largely compliant (LC) = 3 
4) Compliant (C) = 4 
 
By doing so, it allows for all data to be represented. It aids the analysis to differentiate which 
countries follow more closely a risk-based approach and those that do not. The report further 
consists of follow-up reports (FUR) in which the evaluators provide an updated rating in either 
of the 4 categories mentioned. However, it is not clear why some countries have only the initial 
MER and no FUR, the initial MER followed by one FUR, while others can have the initial 
MER and several FURs. Based on the initial MER and FUR (can be one or several), a final 
rating is given. Because of this ambiguity, for this thesis, the rating from the initial MER was 
used as this provides a common baseline for all countries and at the same time gives a closer 
understanding and reflection of the status quo before the FUR interventions. 
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4.3 Selection of countries 
The countries selected was not a random process but followed a systematic approach. It is 
largely based on the selection of countries used by Gelemerova (2011), where the original 
members of the FATF; USA, Japan, Germany, France, UK, Italy, Canada, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Austria, Spain and Australia were selected 
as a start. Secondly, developing countries (former socialist block and third world countries) 
and some offshore centres or well-known tax havens were also chosen. Of all the countries in 
consideration, a second criteria was whether the SAR data was available. An equally important 
consideration was given to whether countries have completed the 4th round of mutual 
evaluations because the evaluation of adherence to the RBA only started from the 4th round. 
Unfortunately, some of the countries have yet to complete the 4th mutual evaluation, and 
conversely those that have completed mutual evaluations did not have easily accessible SAR 
data, and hence have been excluded. However, for those of which SAR data was available, it 
is still interesting to have a view of the SAR trends for some of these countries but with regards 
to the regression analysis, only countries that both SAR data was obtained and have initial 
MER ratings were selected. 
Table 1: Total number of countries with available SAR data 
Country Country Country 
Australia Lithuania Fiji 
Austria Luxembourg Zimbabwe 
Belgium Malta Samoa 
Brazil Netherlands Estonia 
Bulgaria Norway The Cayman Islands 
Canada Panama Madagascar 
Croatia Poland Andorra 
Cyprus Romania Bermuda 
Czech Republic Singapore The Cook Islands 
Denmark Slovak Republic Isle of Man 
Finland Slovenia Mongolia 
France Spain Ukraine 
Germany Sweden  
Greece Switzerland  
Hong Kong S.A.R, China Turkey  
Hungary United Kingdom  
Iceland United States  
Ireland Bahamas  
Italy Bahamas  
Japan Bhutan  
South Korea Botswana  




Table 2: Countries that have completed 4th round of MER 
Country Country Country 
Australia Lithuania Bahamas 
Austria Malta Bhutan 
Belgium Mexico Botswana 
Canada Norway Haiti 
Cyprus Panama Zambia 
Czech Republic Portugal Fiji 
Denmark Russian Federation Zimbabwe 
Finland Singapore Samoa 
Greece Slovak Republic The Cayman Islands 
Hong Kong S.A.R, China Slovenia Madagascar 
Hungary Spain Andorra 
Iceland Sweden Bermuda 
Indonesia Switzerland The Cook Islands 
Ireland Turkey Isle of Man 
Italy United Kingdom Mongolia 
South Korea United States Ukraine 
Latvia   
 
 
Table 3: Countries with both SAR and MER data 
Country Country Country 
1. Australia 17. Lithuania 33. Bhutan 
2. Austria 18. Malta 34. Botswana 
3. Belgium 19. Norway 35. Zambia 
4. Canada 20. Panama 36. Fiji 
5. Cyprus 21. Portugal 37. Zimbabwe 
6. Czech Republic 22. Singapore 38. Samoa 
7. Denmark 23. Slovak Republic 39. The Cayman Islands 
8. Finland 24. Slovenia 40. Madagascar 
9. Greece 25. Spain 41. Andorra 
10. Hong Kong S.A.R, China 26. Sweden 42. Bermuda 
11. Hungary 27. Switzerland 43. The Cook Islands 
12. Iceland 28. Turkey 44. Isle of Man 
13. Ireland 29. United Kingdom 45. Mongolia 
14. Italy 30. United States 46. Ukraine 
15. South Korea 31. Bahamas  
16. Latvia 32. Bangladesh  
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Table 4: Country by region 
Africa Asia Pacific Central Europe 
Botswana* Australia* Austria* 
Zambia* Hong Kong S.A.R, China* Czech Republic* 
Zimbabwe* India Germany 
 Indonesia Hungary* 
 Japan Luxembourg 
 South Korea* Slovak Republic* 
 Singapore* Slovenia* 
 Bahamas* Switzerland* 
 Bhutan*  
 Fiji*  
 Samoa*  
 Mongolia*  
   
Eastern Europe Northern Europe Southern Europe 
Latvia* Denmark* Bulgaria 
Lithuania* Finland* Croatia 
Poland Iceland* Greece* 
Romania Norway* Italy* 
Russian Federation Sweden* Portugal 
Ukraine* Estonia Spain* 
  Turkey* 
  Andorra* 
   
Western Europe Latin America Offshore 
Belgium* Brazil Cyprus* 
France Mexico Malta* 
Ireland* North America Panama* 
Netherlands Canada* Bahamas* 
United Kingdom* United States* The Cayman Islands* 
  Madagascar* 
  Bermuda* 
  The Cook Islands* 
  Isle of Man* 





4.4 Control Variables 
There could be other factors not included that may correlate with the explanatory variables as 
well as have an impact on SAR levels (Wooldridge, 2015) and hence these variables were 
included as a form of control. Further, in consideration of the proposed model, the control 
variables also reflect the determinants of SARs and are included where data is available. 
 
4.4.1 Gross Domestic Product 
The gross domestic product (GDP) of a country is used as one of the control variables. 
Specifically, the log GDP per capita will be used. Intuitively, one can expect the amount of 
financial activity to correlate with the economic progress of society. As income levels increase, 
this results in more financial activity and would increase the probability that a SAR is filed 
hence providing a reason why the GDP is included as a control. Also, (Beck et al., 2000) 
suggests that measures of the size of the banking sector, which is also another control variable 
in consideration, have shown to be highly correlated with subsequent growth of GDP per 
capita. 
 
4.4.2 Bureaucratic effectiveness and efficiency 
The effectiveness of the state can correlate strongly with MER compliance ratings as well as 
have an impact on SAR levels. The world governance indicators (WGI) in particular 
government effectiveness, control of corruption and voice and accountability is taken into 
consideration. These indicators reflect perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality 
of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment 
to such policies. Similarly, Hauner and Kyobe (2010) also used the WGI indicators in their 
study. They argue that institutions can be considered determinants of  economic growth and 
financial development and in this sense reflects the effectiveness and efficiency of 
government. Control of corruption is a very intuitive determinant of efficiency, given that 
corruption propagates waste. Moreover, it is well-established that corruption is bad for growth 
(Mauro, 1995). In the earlier sections, it was presented that individuals’ decision making is 
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bounded by the information presented to them and how they perceive it. Since control of 
corruption is a perception based index, it could well be that the perception of how corrupt a 
society is will affect AML concerns as it pertains to SAR filing. Perhaps a more activity that 
is corrupt in the sense of the word may not be perceived as such in highly corrupt societies. 
 
Voice and accountability reflects citizen perceptions whether they are able to participate in 
selecting their government and to what extent, as well as how freely they are able to express 
their views to demand change and hold governments accountable (WGI, 2021). This index 
could indicate how citizens or workers feel they can effect change which could affect SAR 
levels.  
 
Government effectiveness, as the term suggests, represents the perceptions of how effective 
government has been. It reflects the perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality 
of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment 
to such policies (ibid). It could affect SAR levels similar to how it is for voice and 
accountability where individuals may feel that their actions can have impact on eventual 
deterrence in the greater scheme of things, by their actions to file a SAR. 
 
4.4.3 Size of the financial sector 
As financial activity is correlated to the size of the financial sector, measures and indicators 
of financial sector size and depth were taken into consideration. The financial size can be 
measured by indicators like broad money to GDP, private sector credit to GDP (%) (domestic 
credit to private sector) and ratio of bank deposits to GDP (%) (Podpiera, 2005). Broad money 
to GDP was dropped due to lack of data for the concerned countries in this study. The central 
bank assets as a percentage to GDP is also included as these activities can form a large part of 
financial activity within a country (Beck et al., 2000). 
 
Financial depth can be measured by using the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP (Rousseau and 
Wachtel, 2000). Further, Beck et al (2000) also indicates that this metric can capture the 
overall size of the financial sector as a percentage of gross domestic product. Another variable 
that can be used as a good substitute for financial depth is the amount of private credit relative 
to gross domestic product (GDP). More specifically, the variable is defined as domestic private 
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Here, SAR trends for the countries which have available SAR data is provided so that it can 
be seen that SAR levels have been rising. The data representation is segmented into countries 
that (i) receive less than 1800 reports, (ii) between 1800 to 2500 reports, (iii) between 2500 to 
5000, (iv) between 5000 to 15000 reports, (v) between15000 to 70000 reports, (vi) between 
70000 and 250000 and (vii) more than 250000. This provides better viewing of the graphs. 
The results from the regression will also be presented. 
 
 
  2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Bhutan BTN 1 3 2 6 7 
Samoa WSM 10 46 43 90 76 
The Cook Islands COK 35 31 58 126 92 
Andorra AND 60 53 116 124 138 
Botswana BWA NA 89 128 168 157 
Madagascar MDG 197 115 151 187 164 
Bermuda BMU 447 478 942 667 391 
Fiji FJI 516 579 650 632 622 
Zambia ZMB NA NA 969 724 748 
Bahamas BHS 297 306 446 540 NA 









BTN WSM COK AND BWA MDG BMU FJI ZMB BHS ZWE
Countries receiving < 1800 annual reports





SVN HRV CYM LTU ISL CYP IMN CAN MNG
Countries receiving 1800 - 2500 annual reports
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
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  2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Slovenia SVN 521 449 558 787 1069 
Croatia HRV 972 1030 940 948 1129 
The Cayman Islands CYM 568 620 1164 935 1138 
Lithuania LTU 480 541 835 1368 1501 
Iceland ISL 158 655 952 1203 1646 
Cyprus CYP 938 1623 1480 1836 1763 
Isle of Man IMN NA 932 1410 1757 2056 
Canada CAN 1260 1655 2015 2466 2276 




  2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Slovak Republic SVK 3264 3297 2636 2509 2576 
Panama PAN 1734 1995 3260 3450 2678 
Malta MLT 281 565 778 1679 2778 
Bulgaria BGR 2461 2987 3066 2777 2894 
Austria AUT 1793 2150 3058 2744 3073 
Bangladesh BGD 1094 1687 2357 3878 3573 
Czech Republic CZE 2963 2948 3524 4028 3954 









SVK PAN MLT BGR AUT BGD CZE POL
Countries receiving 2500 - 5000 annual reports





BRL EST ESP ROU CHE NOR HUN
Countries receiving 5000 - 15000 annual reports





  2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Brazil BRL NA 5661 6608 7345 6272 
Estonia EST 8204 5525 5418 5614 6164 
Spain ESP 4757 4990 4999 6563 7354 
Romania ROU 4610 3516 12863 9040 7460 
Switzerland CHE 2367 2909 4684 6126 7705 
Norway NOR 4714 8780 8953 10763 11564 




  2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Sweden SWE 10170 13322 16551 19306 21709 
Belgium BEL 28272 27264 31080 33445 25991 
Singapore SGP 30511 34129 35471 32660 32022 
Latvia LVA 17113 15768 17934 31815 32028 
Luxembourg LUX 11023 30710 38744 55948 52374 
Denmark DNK 15619 18669 24911 35768 53454 
Greece GRC 23559 6295 5597 6450 NA 
Ireland IRL 21682 23308 24398 23939 NA 









SWE BEL SGP LVA LUX DNK GRC IRL FIN
Countries receiving 15000 - 70000 annual reports





  2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Hong Kong S.A.R, 
China HKG 42555 76590 92115 73889 51588 
France FRA 45266 64815 71070 79367 99527 
Italy ITA 82428 101065 93820 98030 105789 
Germany DEU 32008 45597 59845 77252 114914 
Turkey TUR 74221 132570 176411 222743 203786 




  2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Japan JPN 399508 401091 400043 417465 440492 
United Kingdom GBR 381882 419451 214662 463938 487437 
South Korea KOR 624076 703356 519908 972320 926947 
United States USA 1812665 1975638 2034406 2171173 2301163 
Netherlands NLD 312160 417067 361015 753352 2462973 









HKG FRA ITA DEU TUR AUS
Countries receiving 70000 - 250000 annual reports









JPN GBR KOR USA NLD UKR
Countries receiving > 250000 annual reports
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
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Based on the majority of the annual reports, SAR levels have been increasing since the 
introduction of the risk-based approach in 2013 which it sought to decrease. 
 
Table 5: Mutual Evaluation Scores 
 Compliance Score Converted Score 
Australia PC 2 
Austria PC 2 
Belgium LC 3 
Canada LC 3 
Cyprus LC 3 
Czech Republic LC 3 
Denmark PC 2 
Finland LC 3 
Greece LC 3 
Hong Kong S.A.R, China LC 3 
Hungary PC 2 
Iceland PC 2 
Ireland LC 3 
Italy LC 3 
South Korea LC 3 
Latvia C 4 
Lithuania PC 2 
Malta LC 3 
Norway PC 2 
Panama LC 3 
Portugal LC 3 
Singapore LC 3 
Slovak Republic PC 2 
Slovenia PC 2 
Spain C 4 
Sweden LC 3 
Switzerland LC 3 
Turkey LC 3 
United Kingdom LC 3 
United States PC 2 
Bahamas PC 2 
Bangladesh PC 2 
Bhutan NC 1 
Botswana NC 1 
Zambia LC 3 
Fiji PC 2 
Zimbabwe PC 2 
Samoa PC 2 
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The Cayman Islands PC 2 
Madagascar NC 1 
Andorra LC 3 
Bermuda C 4 
The Cook Islands LC 3 
Isle of Man LC 3 
Mongolia PC 2 
Ukraine LC 3 
*C – Compliant, LC – Largely Compliant,  PC – Partially Compliant, NC – Non-compliant 
 
 
5.1 Regression analysis 
 
The main model specification is as follows: 
 
TotalSARit =  b0 + b1ComplianceScoreit + b3logGDPpercapitait + 
b4LiquidLiabilitiesToGDPit + b5DomesticCreditToPrivateSectorit + 
b6BankDepositsToGDPit + b7CentralBankAssetsToGDPit + b8GovtEffectivenessit + 
b9VoiceAccountabilityit + b10ControlofCorruptionit + d0d2016 + d1d2017 + d2d2018 + 
d3d2019 + µ1Country1 +…+ µkCountryk + u 
 
Fixed/Random effects estimation methods are preferred when estimating longitudinal or panel 
data. In this specific case, a random effect (RE) estimation method was chosen as the random 
effect estimator gives us a chance to estimate the effect of non-time-varying explanatory 
variables and still take account of unobserved country specific effects. The RE is preferred 
over fixed effects (FE) as it is more efficient (smaller standard deviations) than the FE 
estimator (Wooldridge, 2015). In addition, a fixed effect estimator was not used as FE 
estimators allow for correlation between the explanatory variable of concern and unobserved 
effects. In this case it will be the variable ‘ComplianceScore’ and its coefficient, and the 
unobserved country specific effect (ibid). However, because there is no variation over time for 
the initial compliance score, which is fixed, the effect of this non-time varying explanatory 
variable on the dependent variable (SAR level) cannot be identified. Thus, in this analysis the 
FE estimation will not be undertaken because it is known that there will be no result for the 
variable of concern. 
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An ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation was also employed to include an additional level 
of comparison. The country dummies were included for OLS due to this method’s inability to 
pick up country specific differences. However, due to problems of serial correlation within the 
variables not included in the model (residuals) this may lead to estimators that are not reliable 
(ibid). Further, the sample size available is not at a large enough level that can overcome these 
inefficiencies. Indeed, Wooldridge (2015) concludes that the sign of the OLS estimator may 
be affected in small samples. RE is taking into account this dependency between the residuals 
for country i, (all countries), and thus, RE is preferred over OLS for panel data sets which is 
the type of dataset used for the analysis. 
 
The results are presented below in Table 6: 
 
Table 6: OLS and RE results 
 OLS RE 








































CentralBankAssetsToGDP -4.86e+04*** -2.90e+04* 


































































































































R-squared 0.949  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
As can be seen from the results, the OLS has a very high R square and indeed there may be 
some issues with serial correlation as with panel data and so OLS does not provide enough 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis. On the other hand, as expected, for RE, the coefficient 
is positive and significant at the 10% level (p<0.10), thus providing evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis. As mentioned, the RE estimator is more suitable in this situation where panel data 
is used compared to the simple OLS method. 
 
The initial impressions from the results show what has been the intuition throughout this 
thesis; that there is a relationship between SAR levels and the risk-based approach. There is 
sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between how 







The absolute SAR levels have been rising year on year overall with only some exceptions. 
This is intriguing as the introduction of the risk-based approach was seen as a solution to the 
increasing number of SARs. As pointed out in the previous sections, the risk-based approach 
allowed and compelled regulated entities to have to determine by themselves what was risky 
and what was not. This resulted in regulators and regulated entities making their own 
interpretations especially when it came to identifying PEPs, beneficial owners and 
categorizing high-risk countries. In reality, only the evaluators who assess the countries during 
the mutual evaluations have an idea of the criteria but even so the evaluation process can be 
arbitrary at times (Van Duyne et al., 2018). One of the major incentives to comply with 
regulations is the potential of a fine if and when a true suspicious activity goes undetected and 
is captured by enforcement. Thus, to avoid those fines, regulated entities would rather shift 
the risk to enforcement authorities, contributing to the problem of what is known as defensive 
reporting. This essentially dilutes the effect of reporting itself, what Takáts (2011) termed as 
the ‘crying wolf’ phenomenon. This led to the question of the actual effect that the risk-based 
approach had on SAR levels and whether it was performing its role as intended. Certainly, 
SAR levels were already rising before it was introduced, and one wonders if there truly is a 
relationship between continued rising levels and the RBA. Thus, introducing the hypothesis: 
There is no relationship between how closely countries adopt a risk-based approach and 
suspicious activity reporting levels. 
 
After running a regression using a random effect estimator, the results indicate that there is 
sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that a relationship between the 
two does exist. Specifically, there is significant and positive relationship between SAR levels 
and the compliance score that was provided from the MER process. What this means is that 
as compliance rating rises, that is, as countries are more compliant with the RBA and do well 
in the evaluation thus receiving a higher score, they in turn also file more SARs. This is not in 
line what the RBA is expected to do at all. The RBA was seen as a way for regulated entities 
to reduce the filing of ‘empty’ reports, the ones that meet rudimentary criteria. An example 
can be a large bank which receives large transactions daily compared with a small bank which 
only has one or two large transactions per week. It is not efficient for the large bank to report 
all transactions that meet a threshold amount. For a long time, this was the case as with the 
CTR. Hence the introduction of the RBA sought to reduce the volume of such SARs. Thus, if 
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regulated entities follow the RBA, they should in essence file less SARs. But this is not the 
case as the results have shown. The literature points to the fact that this could be due to the 
ambiguity and uncertainty with regards to the FATF’s broad definition which leads to 




The push by industry for the risk-based approach had good intentions in theory but falls short 
when implemented in reality. Guidance by the FATF remains ambiguous even with many 
handbooks and methodologies released for countries to follow. Criteria for evaluation remains 
arbitrary as well. The questions asked in the evaluation process about the countries and their 
economies, the nature and development of money laundering, law enforcement actions, the 
state of law to name a few, requires a level of sophistication and deep insight across industries 
and sectors to address these questions in a valid manner. This process is further impeded 
without any valid statistics that both assessors and those evaluated can agree that best indicates 
AML/CFT regime performance. SAR levels remain to be one statistic that can have potential 
to reveal insights however, without understanding the drivers of SARs this can be difficult. 
The results of this analysis bring forward two implications. The first being that we understand 
the possible causes for variations in SAR levels and can account for it and hopefully be able 
to assess the performance of a country’s AML/CFT framework through SAR numbers. The 
second highlights a need to provide more detailed guidance regarding how countries can cope 
with the risk-based approach which means there is a great need for policy makers to revisit 
this particular recommendation. SARs remain to be one of the only tools to report money 
laundering as it is occurring. If the RBA can be adjusted to actually perform as is intended, we 
can avoid the eroding value of suspicious activity reporting and SAR regimes. By slowly 
uncovering certain features that have an impact on SAR levels, we can account for it and 
ultimately be able to use SAR statistics as an input to how effective a country’s AML regime 
is. As it is now, the mutual evaluation serves that purpose but lacks objective criteria as has 
been criticized. Certainly the ability to be able to use SAR statistics can help validate their 
assessment of whether a country is doing well or poorly on the AML/CFT front. 
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6.2 Limitations  
A distinct limitation would be the selection of countries which were constrained by several 
factors and thus the selection process was not a random one. Firstly, some countries had to be 
dropped from the analysis because the MER was yet to be conducted for them at the time of 
the study thus limiting our sample size. Secondly, for those that had the MER conducted, there 
were no SAR data that were accessible. Thirdly, an attempt to analyse all countries who had 
the MER conducted already at the time of the analysis was not feasible due to the duration of 
the thesis. Which bring us to the main limitation, that SAR data is not readily available in a 
central database. Certain FIUs such as Singapore’s Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office 
(STRO), FinCEN in the US, Joint Financial Intelligence Unit (JFIU) Hong Kong publish the 
latest data on their website, but majority have little to zero information. Further, when one digs 
deep enough and finally finds the annual report of the FIU, the differences in reporting 
standards and different terms used makes it difficult to use the statistic. Certainly, it would be 
a benefit if the reporting followed a certain framework or standard (similar to accounting) to 
allow greater comparability and more in-depth analysis of SAR across countries. This would 
also benefit researchers who would like to investigate more clearly the extent of money 
laundering and would thus require the amount of money laundered, which a standard reporting 
framework would help rather than the estimations most researchers work with.  
 
Specifically, other than the ambiguity surrounding what a suspicious transaction is, several 
countries have different ways of documenting suspicious transactions. For example, the 
Netherlands and a few others separate the reported transactions into Unusual and Suspicious. 
This was done primarily because their countries have a large volume of suspicious transactions 
and this allows enforcement to really focus on those transactions that have a high potential of 
money laundering. The downside to this is because countries have the freedom to report in 
however way that they choose, it makes analysis difficult. Thus, there may be a problem with 
reliability and validity. However, extensive effort was undertaken to make sure the data came 
from legitimate sources such as annual reports as well as databases from the World Bank. 
 
Some countries also have missing data for certain years for each variable in this analysis. 
However, the use of panel data smooths out these missing data as it is not expected that the 
data is very different from year to year within countries. Further, the selection process 
followed a systematic approach, ensuring countries from different regions as well as small 
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island nations were selected, avoiding bias. In additions, effort was made to ensure the annual 
reports were retrieved from the correct FIU websites. 
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7. Avenues for further research 
Certainly, when the 4th round of mutual evaluations have reached their conclusion, a more 
extensive analysis including all countries involved in the evaluations would be able to add to 
the validity of the current research. In terms of extending on this area of research, what would 
be interesting is to observe for two very similar countries in terms of history, size, money 
flows, economy and so on and to compare their SAR trends after the introduction of the RBA 
in 2013 using a diff-in-diff method. This can lend to the argument of causality. As it stands 
now, there is a positive and significant relationship, but if the RBA is not a causal factor of 
SAR levels, what could be driving these SAR levels up? Could it really then be that money 
laundering is increasing? This is interesting to investigate. 
 
This research also attempted to consolidate the literature surrounding various determinants of 
SAR. It would certainly be interesting to see what the results would be if these were tested 
empirically. 
 
An outstanding question remains and another area that would be useful to explore would be 
what SARs can actually measure. It would be ideal if each country can determine a range of 
SAR that indicates a low/medium/high performance of their AML/CFT efforts. There is 
certainly much work to be done in this respect but highlighting and providing empirical 
support that countries which follow the RBA more closely experience higher SAR levels is 
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Dataset SAR, region 
 
Year Country_Num Country 
Country 
Abbreviation Total SAR Region 
2015 1 Australia AUS 81,074 Asia Pacific 
2016 1 Australia AUS 78,846 Asia Pacific 
2017 1 Australia AUS 74,120 Asia Pacific 
2018 1 Australia AUS 125,900 Asia Pacific 
2019 1 Australia AUS 246,458 Asia Pacific 
2015 2 Austria AUT 1793 Central Europe 
2016 2 Austria AUT 2150 Central Europe 
2017 2 Austria AUT 3058 Central Europe 
2018 2 Austria AUT 2744 Central Europe 
2019 2 Austria AUT 3073 Central Europe 
2015 3 Belgium BEL 28,272 Western Europe 
2016 3 Belgium BEL 27,264 Western Europe 
2017 3 Belgium BEL 31,080 Western Europe 
2018 3 Belgium BEL 33,445 Western Europe 
2019 3 Belgium BEL 25,991 Western Europe 
2015 4 Brazil BRL 4304 Latin America 
2016 4 Brazil BRL 5661 Latin America 
2017 4 Brazil BRL 6608 Latin America 
2018 4 Brazil BRL 7345 Latin America 
2019 4 Brazil BRL 6272 Latin America 
2015 5 Bulgaria BGR 2461 Southern Europe 
2016 5 Bulgaria BGR 2987 Southern Europe 
2017 5 Bulgaria BGR 3066 Southern Europe 
2018 5 Bulgaria BGR 2777 Southern Europe 
2019 5 Bulgaria BGR 2894 Southern Europe 
2015 6 Canada CAN 1260 North America 
2016 6 Canada CAN 1655 North America 
2017 6 Canada CAN 2015 North America 
2018 6 Canada CAN 2466 North America 
2019 6 Canada CAN 2276 North America 
2015 7 Croatia HRV 972 Southern Europe 
2016 7 Croatia HRV 1030 Southern Europe 
2017 7 Croatia HRV 940 Southern Europe 
2018 7 Croatia HRV 948 Southern Europe 
2019 7 Croatia HRV 1129 Southern Europe 
2015 8 Cyprus CYP 938 Offshore 
2016 8 Cyprus CYP 1623 Offshore 
2017 8 Cyprus CYP 1480 Offshore 
2018 8 Cyprus CYP 1836 Offshore 
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2019 8 Cyprus CYP 1763 Offshore 
2015 9 Czech Republic CZE 2963 Central Europe 
2016 9 Czech Republic CZE 2948 Central Europe 
2017 9 Czech Republic CZE 3524 Central Europe 
2018 9 Czech Republic CZE 4028 Central Europe 
2019 9 Czech Republic CZE 3954 Central Europe 
2015 10 Denmark DNK 15619 Northern Europe 
2016 10 Denmark DNK 18669 Northern Europe 
2017 10 Denmark DNK 24911 Northern Europe 
2018 10 Denmark DNK 35768 Northern Europe 
2019 10 Denmark DNK 53454 Northern Europe 
2015 11 Finland FIN 37703 Northern Europe 
2016 11 Finland FIN 31195 Northern Europe 
2017 11 Finland FIN 48318 Northern Europe 
2018 11 Finland FIN 39220 Northern Europe 
2019 11 Finland FIN . Northern Europe 
2015 12 France FRA 45266 Western Europe 
2016 12 France FRA 64815 Western Europe 
2017 12 France FRA 71070 Western Europe 
2018 12 France FRA 79367 Western Europe 
2019 12 France FRA 99527 Western Europe 
2015 13 Germany DEU 32008 Central Europe 
2016 13 Germany DEU 45597 Central Europe 
2017 13 Germany DEU 59845 Central Europe 
2018 13 Germany DEU 77252 Central Europe 
2019 13 Germany DEU 114914 Central Europe 
2015 14 Greece GRC 23559 Southern Europe 
2016 14 Greece GRC 6295 Southern Europe 
2017 14 Greece GRC 5597 Southern Europe 
2018 14 Greece GRC 6450 Southern Europe 
2019 14 Greece GRC . Southern Europe 
2015 15 Hong Kong S.A.R, CHINA HKG 42555 Asia Pacific 
2016 15 Hong Kong S.A.R, CHINA HKG 76590 Asia Pacific 
2017 15 Hong Kong S.A.R, CHINA HKG 92115 Asia Pacific 
2018 15 Hong Kong S.A.R, CHINA HKG 73889 Asia Pacific 
2019 15 Hong Kong S.A.R, CHINA HKG 51588 Asia Pacific 
2015 16 Hungary HUN 8369 Central Europe 
2016 16 Hungary HUN 8786 Central Europe 
2017 16 Hungary HUN 8585 Central Europe 
2018 16 Hungary HUN 10397 Central Europe 
2019 16 Hungary HUN 12342 Central Europe 
2015 17 Iceland ISL 158 Northern Europe 
2016 17 Iceland ISL 655 Northern Europe 
2017 17 Iceland ISL 952 Northern Europe 
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2018 17 Iceland ISL 1203 Northern Europe 
2019 17 Iceland ISL 1646 Northern Europe 
2015 18 Ireland IRL 21682 Western Europe 
2016 18 Ireland IRL 23308 Western Europe 
2017 18 Ireland IRL 24398 Western Europe 
2018 18 Ireland IRL 23939 Western Europe 
2019 18 Ireland IRL . Western Europe 
2015 19 Italy ITA 82428 Southern Europe 
2016 19 Italy ITA 101065 Southern Europe 
2017 19 Italy ITA 93820 Southern Europe 
2018 19 Italy ITA 98030 Southern Europe 
2019 19 Italy ITA 105789 Southern Europe 
2015 20 Japan JPN 399508 Asia Pacific 
2016 20 Japan JPN 401091 Asia Pacific 
2017 20 Japan JPN 400043 Asia Pacific 
2018 20 Japan JPN 417465 Asia Pacific 
2019 20 Japan JPN 440492 Asia Pacific 
2015 21 South Korea KOR 624076 Asia Pacific 
2016 21 South Korea KOR 703356 Asia Pacific 
2017 21 South Korea KOR 519908 Asia Pacific 
2018 21 South Korea KOR 972320 Asia Pacific 
2019 21 South Korea KOR 926947 Asia Pacific 
2015 22 Latvia LVA 17113 Eastern Europe 
2016 22 Latvia LVA 15768 Eastern Europe 
2017 22 Latvia LVA 17934 Eastern Europe 
2018 22 Latvia LVA 31815 Eastern Europe 
2019 22 Latvia LVA 32028 Eastern Europe 
2015 23 Lithuania LTU 480 Eastern Europe 
2016 23 Lithuania LTU 541 Eastern Europe 
2017 23 Lithuania LTU 835 Eastern Europe 
2018 23 Lithuania LTU 1368 Eastern Europe 
2019 23 Lithuania LTU 1501 Eastern Europe 
2015 24 Luxembourg LUX 11023 Central Europe 
2016 24 Luxembourg LUX 30710 Central Europe 
2017 24 Luxembourg LUX 38744 Central Europe 
2018 24 Luxembourg LUX 55948 Central Europe 
2019 24 Luxembourg LUX 52374 Central Europe 
2015 25 Malta MLT 281 Offshore 
2016 25 Malta MLT 565 Offshore 
2017 25 Malta MLT 778 Offshore 
2018 25 Malta MLT 1679 Offshore 
2019 25 Malta MLT 2778 Offshore 
2015 26 Netherlands NLD 312160 Western Europe 
2016 26 Netherlands NLD 417067 Western Europe 
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2017 26 Netherlands NLD 361015 Western Europe 
2018 26 Netherlands NLD 753352 Western Europe 
2019 26 Netherlands NLD 2462973 Western Europe 
2015 27 Norway NOR 4714 Northern Europe 
2016 27 Norway NOR 8780 Northern Europe 
2017 27 Norway NOR 8953 Northern Europe 
2018 27 Norway NOR 10763 Northern Europe 
2019 27 Norway NOR 11564 Northern Europe 
2015 28 Panama PAN 1734 Offshore 
2016 28 Panama PAN 1995 Offshore 
2017 28 Panama PAN 3260 Offshore 
2018 28 Panama PAN 3450 Offshore 
2019 28 Panama PAN 2678 Offshore 
2015 29 Poland POL 3520 Eastern Europe 
2016 29 Poland POL 4198 Eastern Europe 
2017 29 Poland POL 4115 Eastern Europe 
2018 29 Poland POL 3622 Eastern Europe 
2019 29 Poland POL 4100 Eastern Europe 
2015 30 Portugal PRT 5047 Southern Europe 
2016 30 Portugal PRT 5368 Southern Europe 
2017 30 Portugal PRT 5799 Southern Europe 
2018 30 Portugal PRT . Southern Europe 
2019 30 Portugal PRT . Southern Europe 
2015 31 Romania ROU 4610 Eastern Europe 
2016 31 Romania ROU 3516 Eastern Europe 
2017 31 Romania ROU 12863 Eastern Europe 
2018 31 Romania ROU 9040 Eastern Europe 
2019 31 Romania ROU 7460 Eastern Europe 
2015 32 Singapore SGP 30511 Asia Pacific 
2016 32 Singapore SGP 34129 Asia Pacific 
2017 32 Singapore SGP 35471 Asia Pacific 
2018 32 Singapore SGP 32660 Asia Pacific 
2019 32 Singapore SGP 32022 Asia Pacific 
2015 33 Slovak Republic SVK 3264 Central Europe 
2016 33 Slovak Republic SVK 3297 Central Europe 
2017 33 Slovak Republic SVK 2636 Central Europe 
2018 33 Slovak Republic SVK 2509 Central Europe 
2019 33 Slovak Republic SVK 2576 Central Europe 
2015 34 Slovenia SVN 521 Central Europe 
2016 34 Slovenia SVN 449 Central Europe 
2017 34 Slovenia SVN 558 Central Europe 
2018 34 Slovenia SVN 787 Central Europe 
2019 34 Slovenia SVN 1069 Central Europe 
2015 35 Spain ESP 4757 Southern Europe 
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2016 35 Spain ESP 4990 Southern Europe 
2017 35 Spain ESP 4999 Southern Europe 
2018 35 Spain ESP 6563 Southern Europe 
2019 35 Spain ESP 7354 Southern Europe 
2015 36 Sweden SWE 10170 Northern Europe 
2016 36 Sweden SWE 13322 Northern Europe 
2017 36 Sweden SWE 16551 Northern Europe 
2018 36 Sweden SWE 19306 Northern Europe 
2019 36 Sweden SWE 21709 Northern Europe 
2015 37 Switzerland CHE 2367 Central Europe 
2016 37 Switzerland CHE 2909 Central Europe 
2017 37 Switzerland CHE 4684 Central Europe 
2018 37 Switzerland CHE 6126 Central Europe 
2019 37 Switzerland CHE 7705 Central Europe 
2015 38 Turkey TUR 74221 Southern Europe 
2016 38 Turkey TUR 132570 Southern Europe 
2017 38 Turkey TUR 176411 Southern Europe 
2018 38 Turkey TUR 222743 Southern Europe 
2019 38 Turkey TUR 203786 Southern Europe 
2015 39 United Kingdom GBR 381882 Western Europe 
2016 39 United Kingdom GBR 419451 Western Europe 
2017 39 United Kingdom GBR 214662 Western Europe 
2018 39 United Kingdom GBR 463938 Western Europe 
2019 39 United Kingdom GBR 487437 Western Europe 
2015 40 United States USA 1812665 North America 
2016 40 United States USA 1975638 North America 
2017 40 United States USA 2034406 North America 
2018 40 United States USA 2171173 North America 
2019 40 United States USA 2301163 North America 
2015 41 Bahamas BHS 297 Offshore 
2016 41 Bahamas BHS 306 Offshore 
2017 41 Bahamas BHS 446 Offshore 
2018 41 Bahamas BHS 540 Offshore 
2019 41 Bahamas BHS . Asia Pacific 
2015 42 Bangladesh BGD 1094 Asia Pacific 
2016 42 Bangladesh BGD 1687 Asia Pacific 
2017 42 Bangladesh BGD 2357 Asia Pacific 
2018 42 Bangladesh BGD 3878 Asia Pacific 
2019 42 Bangladesh BGD 3573 Asia Pacific 
2015 43 Bhutan BTN 1 Asia Pacific 
2016 43 Bhutan BTN 3 Asia Pacific 
2017 43 Bhutan BTN 2 Asia Pacific 
2018 43 Bhutan BTN 6 Asia Pacific 
2019 43 Bhutan BTN 7 Asia Pacific 
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2015 44 Botswana BWA . Africa 
2016 44 Botswana BWA 89 Africa 
2017 44 Botswana BWA 128 Africa 
2018 44 Botswana BWA 168 Africa 
2019 44 Botswana BWA 157 Africa 
2015 45 Zambia ZMB . Africa 
2016 45 Zambia ZMB . Africa 
2017 45 Zambia ZMB 969 Africa 
2018 45 Zambia ZMB 724 Africa 
2019 45 Zambia ZMB 748 Africa 
2015 46 Fiji FJI 516 Asia Pacific 
2016 46 Fiji FJI 579 Asia Pacific 
2017 46 Fiji FJI 650 Asia Pacific 
2018 46 Fiji FJI 632 Asia Pacific 
2019 46 Fiji FJI 622 Asia Pacific 
2015 47 Zimbabwe ZWE 712 Africa 
2016 47 Zimbabwe ZWE 732 Africa 
2017 47 Zimbabwe ZWE 1245 Africa 
2018 47 Zimbabwe ZWE 1733 Africa 
2019 47 Zimbabwe ZWE . Africa 
2015 48 Samoa WSM 10 Asia Pacific 
2016 48 Samoa WSM 46 Asia Pacific 
2017 48 Samoa WSM 43 Asia Pacific 
2018 48 Samoa WSM 90 Asia Pacific 
2019 48 Samoa WSM 76 Asia Pacific 
2015 49 Estonia EST 8204 Northern Europe 
2016 49 Estonia EST 5525 Northern Europe 
2017 49 Estonia EST 5418 Northern Europe 
2018 49 Estonia EST 5614 Northern Europe 
2019 49 Estonia EST 6164 Northern Europe 
2015 50 The Cayman Islands CYM 568 Offshore 
2016 50 The Cayman Islands CYM 620 Offshore 
2017 50 The Cayman Islands CYM 1164 Offshore 
2018 50 The Cayman Islands CYM 935 Offshore 
2019 50 The Cayman Islands CYM 1138 Offshore 
2015 51 Madagascar MDG 197 Offshore 
2016 51 Madagascar MDG 115 Offshore 
2017 51 Madagascar MDG 151 Offshore 
2018 51 Madagascar MDG 187 Offshore 
2019 51 Madagascar MDG 164 Offshore 
2015 52 Andorra AND 60 Southern Europe 
2016 52 Andorra AND 53 Southern Europe 
2017 52 Andorra AND 116 Southern Europe 
2018 52 Andorra AND 124 Southern Europe 
2019 52 Andorra AND 138 Southern Europe 
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2015 53 Bermuda BMU 447 Offshore 
2016 53 Bermuda BMU 478 Offshore 
2017 53 Bermuda BMU 942 Offshore 
2018 53 Bermuda BMU 667 Offshore 
2019 53 Bermuda BMU 391 Offshore 
2015 54 The Cook Islands COK 35 Offshore 
2016 54 The Cook Islands COK 31 Offshore 
2017 54 The Cook Islands COK 58 Offshore 
2018 54 The Cook Islands COK 126 Offshore 
2019 54 The Cook Islands COK 92 Offshore 
2015 55 Isle of Man IMN . Offshore 
2016 55 Isle of Man IMN 932 Offshore 
2017 55 Isle of Man IMN 1410 Offshore 
2018 55 Isle of Man IMN 1757 Offshore 
2019 55 Isle of Man IMN 2056 Offshore 
2015 56 Mongolia MNG 113 Asia Pacific 
2016 56 Mongolia MNG 282 Asia Pacific 
2017 56 Mongolia MNG 203 Asia Pacific 
2018 56 Mongolia MNG 1596 Asia Pacific 
2019 56 Mongolia MNG 2385 Asia Pacific 
2015 57 Ukraine UKR 4391834 Eastern Europe 
2016 57 Ukraine UKR 6381728 Eastern Europe 
2017 57 Ukraine UKR 8044703 Eastern Europe 
2018 57 Ukraine UKR 10006093 Eastern Europe 













MER Rating GDP GDP/capita 
2015 1 AUS          81,074  PC 2 1.35169E+12 56755.72171 
2016 1 AUS          78,846  PC 2 1.20885E+12 49971.13146 
2017 1 AUS          74,120  PC 2 1.32919E+12 54027.96682 
2018 1 AUS        125,900  PC 2 1.43288E+12 57354.96405 
2019 1 AUS        246,458  PC 2 1.39657E+12 55060.3261 
2015 2 AUT 1793 PC 2 3.81818E+11 44178.04738 
2016 2 AUT 2150 PC 2 3.95569E+11 45276.83144 
2017 2 AUT 3058 PC 2 4.17238E+11 47426.51196 
2018 2 AUT 2744 PC 2 4.55095E+11 51478.28526 
2019 2 AUT 3073 PC 2 4.45075E+11 50137.66278 
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2015 3 BEL          28,272  LC 3 4.6215E+11 40991.80814 
2016 3 BEL          27,264  LC 3 4.7574E+11 41984.10303 
2017 3 BEL          31,080  LC 3 5.02698E+11 44192.62303 
2018 3 BEL          33,445  LC 3 5.43734E+11 47583.07494 
2019 3 BEL          25,991  LC 3 5.33097E+11 46420.66377 
2015 4 BRL 4304 . . 1.80221E+12 8814.000987 
2016 4 BRL 5661 . . 1.7957E+12 8710.09669 
2017 4 BRL 6608 . . 2.06283E+12 9925.386238 
2018 4 BRL 7345 . . 1.88548E+12 9001.234249 
2019 4 BRL 6272 . . 1.83976E+12 8717.186278 
2015 5 BGR 2461 . . 50647442757 7055.935673 
2016 5 BGR 2987 . . 53806894796 7548.855007 
2017 5 BGR 3066 . . 58971520599 8334.081728 
2018 5 BGR 2777 . . 66230155100 9427.73043 
2019 5 BGR 2894 . . 68558815112 9828.148515 
2015 6 CAN 1260 LC 3 1.55613E+12 43585.51198 
2016 6 CAN 1655 LC 3 1.52824E+12 42322.48478 
2017 6 CAN 2015 LC 3 1.64988E+12 45148.55271 
2018 6 CAN 2466 LC 3 1.71626E+12 46313.17137 
2019 6 CAN 2276 LC 3 1.73643E+12 46194.72523 
2015 7 HRV 972 . . 49525747504 11781.73479 
2016 7 HRV 1030 . . 51601147666 12361.48383 
2017 7 HRV 940 . . 55481644098 13451.62495 
2018 7 HRV 948 . . 61375222347 15014.08502 
2019 7 HRV 1129 . . 60752588976 14936.10055 
2015 8 CYP 938 LC 3 4708336756 23333.71491 
2016 8 CYP 1623 LC 3 4909498943 24532.51906 
2017 8 CYP 1480 LC 3 5153091158 26338.69434 
2018 8 CYP 1836 LC 3 5517361238 28689.70672 
2019 8 CYP 1763 LC 3 . 27858.371 
2015 9 CZE 2963 LC 3 1.88033E+11 17829.69832 
2016 9 CZE 2948 LC 3 1.96272E+11 18575.23203 
2017 9 CZE 3524 LC 3 2.18629E+11 20636.19995 
2018 9 CZE 4028 LC 3 2.48909E+11 23415.84363 
2019 9 CZE 3954 LC 3 2.50681E+11 23494.5962 
2015 10 DNK 15619 PC 2 3.02673E+11 53254.85637 
2016 10 DNK 18669 PC 2 3.13116E+11 54663.99837 
2017 10 DNK 24911 PC 2 3.32121E+11 57610.09818 
2018 10 DNK 35768 PC 2 3.56879E+11 61598.5367 
2019 10 DNK 53454 PC 2 3.50104E+11 60170.34264 
2015 11 FIN 37703 LC 3 2.3444E+11 42784.69836 
2016 11 FIN 31195 LC 3 2.40608E+11 43784.28396 
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2017 11 FIN 48318 LC 3 2.55232E+11 46336.66325 
2018 11 FIN 39220 LC 3 2.75947E+11 50030.87731 
2019 11 FIN . LC 3 2.69296E+11 48782.78848 
2015 12 FRA 45266 . . 2.43821E+12 36638.18493 
2016 12 FRA 64815 . . 2.47129E+12 37037.37419 
2017 12 FRA 71070 . . 2.59515E+12 38812.16103 
2018 12 FRA 79367 . . 2.78786E+12 41631.09074 
2019 12 FRA 99527 . . 2.71552E+12 40493.92857 
2015 13 DEU 32008 . . 3.35624E+12 41086.72967 
2016 13 DEU 45597 . . 3.4675E+12 42107.51727 
2017 13 DEU 59845 . . 3.6826E+12 44552.81937 
2018 13 DEU 77252 . . 3.96377E+12 47810.50767 
2019 13 DEU 114914 . . 3.86112E+12 46445.2491 
2015 14 GRC 23559 LC 3 1.96591E+11 18167.77373 
2016 14 GRC 6295 LC 3 1.95222E+11 18116.45965 
2017 14 GRC 5597 LC 3 2.03588E+11 18930.21863 
2018 14 GRC 6450 LC 3 2.18138E+11 20324.30499 
2019 14 GRC . LC 3 2.09853E+11 19582.53598 
2015 15 HKG 42555 LC 3 3.09384E+11 42431.88828 
2016 15 HKG 76590 LC 3 3.20838E+11 43731.10682 
2017 15 HKG 92115 LC 3 3.41244E+11 46165.85651 
2018 15 HKG 73889 LC 3 3.61697E+11 48543.40099 
2019 15 HKG 51588 LC 3 3.65712E+11 48713.47375 
2015 16 HUN 8369 PC 2 1.25074E+11 12706.89121 
2016 16 HUN 8786 PC 2 1.28471E+11 13090.50673 
2017 16 HUN 8585 PC 2 1.42962E+11 14605.85435 
2018 16 HUN 10397 PC 2 1.60419E+11 16410.18726 
2019 16 HUN 12342 PC 2 1.63469E+11 16731.82151 
2015 17 ISL 158 PC 2 1.77499E+11 52564.42918 
2016 17 ISL 655 PC 2 1.74896E+11 61466.80395 
2017 17 ISL 952 PC 2 1.95473E+11 71310.93926 
2018 17 ISL 1203 PC 2 2.24228E+11 72968.70423 
2019 17 ISL 1646 PC 2 2.34094E+11 66944.83308 
2015 18 IRL 21682 LC 3 2.915E+11 61995.4228 
2016 18 IRL 23308 LC 3 3.00523E+11 63197.0824 
2017 18 IRL 24398 LC 3 3.35663E+11 69822.34708 
2018 18 IRL 23939 LC 3 3.82674E+11 78621.22793 
2019 18 IRL . LC 3 3.88699E+11 78660.95646 
2015 19 ITA 82428 LC 3 1.8359E+12 30230.2263 
2016 19 ITA 101065 LC 3 1.8758E+12 30939.71425 
2017 19 ITA 93820 LC 3 1.9618E+12 32406.72032 
2018 19 ITA 98030 LC 3 2.09154E+12 34615.75689 
2019 19 ITA 105789 LC 3 2.00358E+12 33228.23668 
2015 20 JPN 399508 . . 4.38948E+12 34524.46986 
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2016 20 JPN 401091 . . 4.92254E+12 38761.81815 
2017 20 JPN 400043 . . 4.86686E+12 38386.51115 
2018 20 JPN 417465 . . 4.95481E+12 39159.42356 
2019 20 JPN 440492 . . 5.08177E+12 40246.88013 
2015 21 KOR 624076 LC 3 1.46577E+12 28732.23108 
2016 21 KOR 703356 LC 3 1.50011E+12 29288.87044 
2017 21 KOR 519908 LC 3 1.6239E+12 31616.8434 
2018 21 KOR 972320 LC 3 1.72485E+12 33422.94421 
2019 21 KOR 926947 LC 3 1.64674E+12 31846.21823 
2015 22 LVA 17113 C 4 27239653844 13774.60527 
2016 22 LVA 15768 C 4 28052325862 14315.79289 
2017 22 LVA 17934 C 4 30458763246 15682.22145 
2018 22 LVA 31815 C 4 34416012859 17858.27998 
2019 22 LVA 32028 C 4 34102913582 17828.89466 
2015 23 LTU 480 PC 2 41418872976 14258.22933 
2016 23 LTU 541 PC 2 43018087238 14998.12506 
2017 23 LTU 835 PC 2 47758736932 16885.40739 
2018 23 LTU 1368 PC 2 53722883091 19176.17652 
2019 23 LTU 1501 PC 2 54627411860 19601.89083 
2015 24 LUX 11023 . . 57744457955 101376.4966 
2016 24 LUX 30710 . . 60691483443 104278.391 
2017 24 LUX 38744 . . 64181944723 107627.151 
2018 24 LUX 55948 . . 70919958016 116654.2611 
2019 24 LUX 52374 . . 71104919108 114704.5942 
2015 25 MLT 281 LC 3 11091434435 24921.60357 
2016 25 MLT 565 LC 3 11665231192 25617.82691 
2017 25 MLT 778 LC 3 13146963159 28091.86165 
2018 25 MLT 1679 LC 3 14750790658 30437.22151 
2019 25 MLT 2778 LC 3 14989415684 29820.60325 
2015 26 NLD 312160 . . 7.65265E+11 45175.23189 
2016 26 NLD 417067 . . 7.83528E+11 46007.85292 
2017 26 NLD 361015 . . 8.3387E+11 48675.22234 
2018 26 NLD 753352 . . 9.14043E+11 53044.53244 
2019 26 NLD 2462973 . . 9.07051E+11 52331.31673 
2015 27 NOR 4714 PC 2 3.85802E+11 74355.51586 
2016 27 NOR 8780 PC 2 3.6882E+11 70459.1825 
2017 27 NOR 8953 PC 2 3.98394E+11 75496.75406 
2018 27 NOR 10763 PC 2 4.34167E+11 81734.46557 
2019 27 NOR 11564 PC 2 4.03336E+11 75419.63487 
2015 28 PAN 1734 LC 3 54091700000 13630.30797 
2016 28 PAN 1995 LC 3 57907700000 14343.96363 
2017 28 PAN 3260 LC 3 62219000000 15150.34561 
2018 28 PAN 3450 LC 3 65128200000 15592.57368 
2019 28 PAN 2678 LC 3 66800800000 15731.01603 
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2015 29 POL 3520 . . 4.77812E+11 12578.49547 
2016 29 POL 4198 . . 4.7263E+11 12447.43959 
2017 29 POL 4115 . . 5.26509E+11 13864.68176 
2018 29 POL 3622 . . 5.87412E+11 15468.48222 
2019 29 POL 4100 . . 5.95858E+11 15692.50703 
2015 30 PRT 5047 LC 3 1.99314E+11 19242.36647 
2016 30 PRT 5368 LC 3 2.06286E+11 19978.40121 
2017 30 PRT 5799 LC 3 2.21358E+11 21490.42986 
2018 30 PRT . LC 3 2.42313E+11 23562.55452 
2019 30 PRT . LC 3 2.38785E+11 23252.05852 
2015 31 ROU 4610 . . 1.77729E+11 8969.148921 
2016 31 ROU 3516 . . 1.88129E+11 9548.587403 
2017 31 ROU 12863 . . 2.11695E+11 10807.79539 
2018 31 ROU 9040 . . 2.41457E+11 12399.88934 
2019 31 ROU 7460 . . 2.50077E+11 12919.52964 
2015 32 SGP 30511 LC 3 3.08004E+11 55646.61875 
2016 32 SGP 34129 LC 3 3.18652E+11 56828.29535 
2017 32 SGP 35471 LC 3 3.41863E+11 60913.74533 
2018 32 SGP 32660 LC 3 3.73217E+11 66188.7794 
2019 32 SGP 32022 LC 3 3.72063E+11 65233.28244 
2015 33 SVK 3264 PC 2 88467555244 16310.98841 
2016 33 SVK 3297 PC 2 89655253976 16508.67036 
2017 33 SVK 2636 PC 2 95494424979 17556.60082 
2018 33 SVK 2509 PC 2 1.05702E+11 19406.34753 
2019 33 SVK 2576 PC 2 1.0508E+11 19266.2755 
2015 34 SVN 521 PC 2 43090173395 20881.76693 
2016 34 SVN 449 PC 2 44736333522 21663.64341 
2017 34 SVN 558 PC 2 48586603448 23512.81727 
2018 34 SVN 787 PC 2 54161636035 26115.91337 
2019 34 SVN 1069 PC 2 54174227309 25946.18219 
2015 35 ESP 4757 C 4 1.19512E+12 25732.01836 
2016 35 ESP 4990 C 4 1.23208E+12 26505.34322 
2017 35 ESP 4999 C 4 1.31254E+12 28170.16786 
2018 35 ESP 6563 C 4 1.42215E+12 30389.36099 
2019 35 ESP 7354 C 4 1.39349E+12 29600.37825 
2015 36 SWE 10170 LC 3 5.05104E+11 51545.48361 
2016 36 SWE 13322 LC 3 5.15655E+11 51965.15715 
2017 36 SWE 16551 LC 3 5.41019E+11 53791.50873 
2018 36 SWE 19306 LC 3 5.55455E+11 54589.06039 
2019 36 SWE 21709 LC 3 5.30884E+11 51615.02065 
2015 37 CHE 2367 LC 3 6.79832E+11 82081.59716 
2016 37 CHE 2909 LC 3 6.71309E+11 80172.23209 
2017 37 CHE 4684 LC 3 6.7995E+11 80449.99451 
2018 37 CHE 6126 LC 3 7.05141E+11 82818.10816 
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2019 37 CHE 7705 LC 3 7.03082E+11 81993.72713 
2015 38 TUR 74221 LC 3 8.64314E+11 11006.24974 
2016 38 TUR 132570 LC 3 8.69683E+11 10895.31869 
2017 38 TUR 176411 LC 3 8.58989E+11 10591.47437 
2018 38 TUR 222743 LC 3 7.78382E+11 9455.593654 
2019 38 TUR 203786 LC 3 7.61425E+11 9126.561346 
2015 39 GBR 381882 LC 3 2.92859E+12 44974.83188 
2016 39 GBR 419451 LC 3 2.69428E+12 41064.13343 
2017 39 GBR 214662 LC 3 2.66623E+12 40361.41738 
2018 39 GBR 463938 LC 3 2.86067E+12 43043.22782 
2019 39 GBR 487437 LC 3 2.82911E+12 42330.11754 
2015 40 USA 1812665 PC 2 1.82247E+13 56839.38177 
2016 40 USA 1975638 PC 2 1.8715E+13 57951.58408 
2017 40 USA 2034406 PC 2 1.95194E+13 60062.22231 
2018 40 USA 2171173 PC 2 2.05802E+13 62996.47129 
2019 40 USA 2301163 PC 2 2.14332E+13 65297.51751 
2015 41 BHS 297 PC 2 11710800000 31295.06208 
2016 41 BHS 306 PC 2 11928500000 31562.63974 
2017 41 BHS 446 PC 2 12490700000 32718.6381 
2018 41 BHS 540 PC 2 13022100000 33767.50337 
2019 41 BHS . PC 2 13578800000 34863.7421 
2015 42 BGD 1094 PC 2 1.95079E+11 1248.453398 
2016 42 BGD 1687 PC 2 2.21415E+11 1401.620628 
2017 42 BGD 2357 PC 2 2.49711E+11 1563.913699 
2018 42 BGD 3878 PC 2 2.74039E+11 1698.350394 
2019 42 BGD 3573 PC 2 3.02571E+11 1855.739824 
2015 43 BTN 1 NC 1 2003598213 2752.664208 
2016 43 BTN 3 NC 1 2158972129 2930.562989 
2017 43 BTN 2 NC 1 2450364928 3286.574703 
2018 43 BTN 6 NC 1 2446866405 3243.486036 
2019 43 BTN 7 NC 1 2530547158 3316.175714 
2015 44 BWA . NC 1 14420593484 6799.870178 
2016 44 BWA 89 NC 1 15646354089 7243.870253 
2017 44 BWA 128 NC 1 17405588070 7893.232534 
2018 44 BWA 168 NC 1 18663265549 8279.601739 
2019 44 BWA 157 NC 1 18340480936 7961.325181 
2015 45 ZMB . LC 3 21243339048 1337.795586 
2016 45 ZMB . LC 3 20954754378 1280.578447 
2017 45 ZMB 969 LC 3 25868165345 1534.866751 
2018 45 ZMB 724 LC 3 26312140829 1516.390661 
2019 45 ZMB 748 LC 3 23309773923 1305.063254 
2015 46 FJI 516 PC 2 4682546881 5390.745258 
2016 46 FJI 579 PC 2 4930204220 5651.318055 
2017 46 FJI 650 PC 2 5353404419 6101.030839 
2018 46 FJI 632 PC 2 5581393121 6317.487853 
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2019 46 FJI 622 PC 2 5496250694 6175.88872 
2015 47 ZWE 712 PC 2 19963120600 1445.071062 
2016 47 ZWE 732 PC 2 20548678100 1464.583529 
2017 47 ZWE 1245 PC 2 22040902300 1548.170056 
2018 47 ZWE 1733 PC 2 24311560500 1683.740577 
2019 47 ZWE . PC 2 21440758800 1463.98591 
2015 48 WSM 10 PC 2 788307330.6 4073.66601 
2016 48 WSM 46 PC 2 799376439.5 4109.165135 
2017 48 WSM 43 PC 2 832153612.6 4259.765001 
2018 48 WSM 90 PC 2 821496064.5 4188.528346 
2019 48 WSM 76 PC 2 852250191 4324.014018 
2015 49 EST 8204 . . 23048864243 17522.23019 
2016 49 EST 5525 . . 24259552889 18437.25282 
2017 49 EST 5418 . . 26951648829 20458.46073 
2018 49 EST 5614 . . 30631142227 23170.70738 
2019 49 EST 6164 . . 31471100656 23723.30611 
2015 50 CYM 568 PC 2 4708336756 76280.48662 
2016 50 CYM 620 PC 2 4909498943 78465.35733 
2017 50 CYM 1164 PC 2 5153091158 81302.12297 
2018 50 CYM 935 PC 2 5517361238 85975.02474 
2019 50 CYM 1138 PC 2 . . 
2015 51 MDG 197 NC 1 11323023787 467.2353994 
2016 51 MDG 115 NC 1 11848615018 475.9554172 
2017 51 MDG 151 NC 1 13176313233 515.2927249 
2018 51 MDG 187 NC 1 13853433948 527.5013261 
2019 51 MDG 164 NC 1 14114631281 523.3590645 
2015 52 AND 60 LC 3 2789870188 35762.52307 
2016 52 AND 53 LC 3 2896679212 37474.66541 
2017 52 AND 116 LC 3 3000180750 38962.88035 
2018 52 AND 124 LC 3 3218316013 41793.05526 
2019 52 AND 138 LC 3 3154057987 40886.39116 
2015 53 BMU 447 C 4 6654541000 102005.6256 
2016 53 BMU 478 C 4 6899911000 106885.8785 
2017 53 BMU 942 C 4 7142316000 111820.5815 
2018 53 BMU 667 C 4 7224329000 113021.4174 
2019 53 BMU 391 C 4 7484113000 117089.2863 
2015 54 COK 35 LC 3 . . 
2016 54 COK 31 LC 3 . . 
2017 54 COK 58 LC 3 . . 
2018 54 COK 126 LC 3 . . 
2019 54 COK 92 LC 3 . . 
2015 55 IMN . LC 3 7085288006 85124.92498 
2016 55 IMN 932 LC 3 6846691871 82206.009 
2017 55 IMN 1410 LC 3 6979581725 83489.81704 
2018 55 IMN 1757 LC 3 7491969313 89108.42814 
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2019 55 IMN 2056 LC 3 . . 
2015 56 MNG 113 PC 2 11749620620 3918.579174 
2016 56 MNG 282 PC 2 11186734674 3660.150746 
2017 56 MNG 203 PC 2 11425755280 3669.41754 
2018 56 MNG 1596 PC 2 13108769496 4134.987198 
2019 56 MNG 2385 PC 2 13996719329 4339.843279 
2015 57 UKR 4391834 LC 3 91030959455 2124.662319 
2016 57 UKR 6381728 LC 3 93355993629 2187.73051 
2017 57 UKR 8044703 LC 3 1.1219E+11 2640.675677 
2018 57 UKR 10006093 LC 3 1.30902E+11 3096.817402 
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2015 AUS 6.175417973 109.43 136.31738 137.536 102.579 0.533403 
2016 AUS 6.704061782 111.691 142.4231683 141.369 104.85 0.717191 
2017 AUS 7.136161695 111.087 140.2926654 140.433 96.1906 0.539303 
2018 AUS 7.105988486 . 139.5259087 . . . 
2019 AUS 7.5262285 . 135.8407547 . . . 
2015 AUT 7.446891279 90.3446 85.89120788 84.7514 78.4534 2.61299 
2016 AUT 7.334234175 91.5824 83.1743254 82.4659 79.9319 6.48676 
2017 AUT 7.541992275 93.1049 84.15090153 81.69 81.3851 10.7219 
2018 AUT 7.707002394 . 84.3347535 . . . 
2019 AUT 7.949258695 . 85.83456195 . . . 
2015 BEL 6.783034374 123.537 60.63286564 59.1908 108.189 2.86505 
2016 BEL 7.053282196 124.777 63.37673015 61.7663 110.146 7.38124 
2017 BEL 7.549625197 123.134 65.10467288 63.2854 109.614 12.6298 
2018 BEL 7.614146331 . 68.03123413 . . . 
2019 BEL 7.446390627 . 70.14903089 . . . 
2015 BRL 8.460618166 77.5074 66.82970064 70.1774 55.346 20.0886 
2016 BRL 9.272248305 82.6837 62.16956213 67.8268 59.2595 22.5593 
2017 BRL 10.04718606 84.5793 59.50382094 63.7813 62.2984 24.2408 
2018 BRL 10.06443595 . 61.22325727 . . . 
2019 BRL 10.21089379 . 63.93441157 . . . 
2015 BGR 12.01590157 80.2208 54.92277352 55.8082 67.2062 0.079325 
2016 BGR 11.62960744 81.103 52.13942224 52.0446 67.5696 0.074153 
2017 BGR 11.3934048 81.8124 49.96831601 49.8052 67.72 0.069519 
2018 BGR 10.82327218 . 50.44045168 . . . 
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2019 BGR 11.59431785 . 49.79655137 . . . 
2015 CAN 5.067827011 . . . . 4.6652 
2016 CAN 5.160559391 . . . . 4.71937 
2017 CAN 5.223244745 . . . . 4.62464 
2018 CAN 5.202677391 . . . . . 
2019 CAN 5.218075498 . . . . . 
2015 HRV 12.6826346 69.5461 64.4233387 65.7553 63.778 0.006067 
2016 HRV 14.04336544 69.6771 60.20155583 60.961 63.5154 0.006093 
2017 HRV 14.82323773 70.0513 57.08092782 57.5896 63.3391 0.006017 
2018 HRV 13.90303792 . 55.40840211 . . . 
2019 HRV 13.85279694 . 54.42082835 . . . 
2015 CYP 10.11403421 200.879 244.1908976 247.982 175.044 0.116737 
2016 CYP 10.31351607 205.679 217.6409743 . . 0.108255 
2017 CYP 9.036913979 207.285 193.6195028 . . 0.100167 
2018 CYP 8.225598417 . 137.703026 . . . 
2019 CYP 9.01047899 . 112.0210434 . . . 
2015 CZE 7.524656077 75.7131 49.54198338 48.5406 65.8606 0.003695 
2016 CZE 7.257311629 77.976 51.05880435 49.7776 67.6313 0.003345 
2017 CZE 6.480188718 80.1115 50.90670769 50.2297 69.5008 0.002884 
2018 CZE 6.543840312 . 51.34685065 . . . 
2019 CZE 6.835157503 . 50.64587136 . . . 
2015 DNK 7.790802433 64.7989 169.9677082 169.976 53.243 0.007027 
2016 DNK 7.386260854 63.3095 166.5609788 166.31 54.5099 0.004536 
2017 DNK 6.896164929 60.5075 161.8070096 163.015 56.2718 0.002473 
2018 DNK 6.979375706 . 161.2404034 . . . 
2019 DNK 7.374379355 . 159.7239387 . . . 
2015 FIN 5.601509764 75.1502 94.44851811 93.1553 64.9835 1.9507 
2016 FIN 6.457187183 76.6398 93.99957705 93.2908 66.5871 6.20142 
2017 FIN 9.025842138 76.5288 93.52108811 92.5026 66.9206 9.86498 
2018 FIN 9.303519062 . 94.16726582 . . . 
2019 FIN 6.845244092 . 95.12047091 . . . 
2015 FRA 5.79380342 91.2062 95.090046 93.5799 76.7879 3.93389 
2016 FRA 6.24897238 93.8062 97.37432351 94.952 78.8187 9.10781 
2017 FRA 6.594008456 97.6455 101.3718189 96.8093 81.437 14.8686 
2018 FRA 6.525498551 . 104.3838086 . . . 
2019 FRA 6.610560832 . 107.6418101 . . . 
2015 DEU 5.94 90.5693 78.12139397 77.123 79.7663 1.54116 
2016 DEU 5.98 92.9247 77.45452573 75.7677 81.0994 5.22441 
2017 DEU 6.33 93.9221 77.76815569 75.4829 82.1452 9.23157 
2018 DEU 6.47 . 78.39072104 . . . 
2019 DEU 6.31 . 80.17668633 . . . 
2015 GRC 9.994418654 98.843 112.2203796 114.236 82.3459 6.81318 
2016 GRC 10.70009327 88.6556 107.3716382 108.795 70.9954 6.85191 
2017 GRC 11.99737325 89.7151 99.06191457 101.738 70.8158 6.99667 
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2018 GRC 10.71579985 . 89.18346768 . . . 
2019 GRC 10.97830461 . 79.18424206 . . . 
2015 HKG 9.47 348.58 207.8993282 212.082 334.551 . 
2016 HKG 9.784437604 362.219 214.3139467 201.608 347.41 . 
2017 HKG 9.833592331 368.922 223.390933 214.125 353.393 . 
2018 HKG 9.491409282 . 219.9289106 . . . 
2019 HKG 9.936605644 . 235.7217552 . . . 
2015 HUN . 56.5443 35.14533101 38.4193 45.0126 0.303932 
2016 HUN . 57.8185 33.45220909 34.2699 45.6685 0.149874 
2017 HUN . 57.7188 32.47548277 32.4091 45.508 0.144079 
2018 HUN . . 32.41901494 . . . 
2019 HUN . . 33.46992729 . . . 
2015 ISL 21.05682283 73.3545 87.87636203 87.0834 71.3229 5.51892 
2016 ISL 20.08117648 67.6386 84.90283848 82.9748 65.5502 2.8082 
2017 ISL 19.33499915 64.3333 87.67602972 84.186 62.1299 1.83755 
2018 ISL 17.03455278 . 92.76085162 . . . 
2019 ISL 16.65787159 . 90.60401729 . . . 
2015 IRL 13.97379448 97.9966 53.10892392 56.7524 68.185 15.0535 
2016 IRL 13.52653797 99.3796 48.12803987 49.6353 71.8195 16.5534 
2017 IRL 14.3478431 97.9057 44.23438554 44.7847 71.0654 16.3596 
2018 IRL 14.85966214 . 41.07818292 . . . 
2019 IRL 13.47394531 . 36.96668577 . . . 
2015 ITA 6.185530291 88.7702 87.34519182 87.4438 78.0547 9.83485 
2016 ITA 5.493010154 90.4453 84.94363796 84.9696 79.2351 15.2365 
2017 ITA 6.635084795 92.9073 80.78255305 81.9551 81.2633 21.3868 
2018 ITA 6.333320109 . 76.73080649 . . . 
2019 ITA 6.712811712 . 74.33978099 . . . 
2015 JPN . 214.297 162.7281536 159.35 215.043 52.4851 
2016 JPN . 217.853 164.7706266 161.19 218.631 65.3124 
2017 JPN . 220.209 169.8143277 163.642 221.003 73.4169 
2018 JPN . . 169.9592324 . . . 
2019 JPN . . 176.2396879 . . . 
2015 KOR 8.028209415 130.835 132.1407127 128.494 119.949 1.28859 
2016 KOR 7.87319981 133.782 134.8257914 130.423 122.709 1.0678 
2017 KOR 7.993132725 135.344 136.4924733 133.001 123.835 0.975497 
2018 KOR 7.955582859 . 141.1550144 . . . 
2019 KOR . . 151.6882658 . . . 
2015 LVA 10.06332947 61.4512 48.32889117 49.7213 40.5622 1.07754 
2016 LVA 10.07565007 63.0363 46.72265552 47.2088 42.3239 2.53659 
2017 LVA 11.13043539 61.7035 42.15521211 43.1244 41.8144 3.31338 
2018 LVA 12.80228965 . 36.62000761 . . . 
2019 LVA 9.704633034 . 34.57272209 . . . 
2015 LTU 11.05792505 51.0548 41.55766482 40.5109 41.6567 1.22446 
2016 LTU 8.627718702 58.4381 42.68978892 41.2074 43.1569 3.06356 
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2017 LTU 9.386035351 57.868 40.97804498 40.4345 43.1183 3.8719 
2018 LTU 9.605509749 . 40.3947421 . . . 
2019 LTU 6.884604165 . 38.88734167 . . . 
2015 LUX 7.010517614 622.696 95.43691322 92.16 385.754 0.980936 
2016 LUX 7.355653733 652.929 99.08646204 97.3554 397.226 2.26199 
2017 LUX 8.350982405 655.247 103.3473826 102.419 399.724 2.89249 
2018 LUX 7.978708957 . 106.3242683 . . . 
2019 LUX 7.44086666 . 107.2936575 . . . 
2015 MLT 7.187747405 159.032 85.26605376 87.1546 140.928 5.9019 
2016 MLT 7.398098465 162.729 81.77545593 81.997 143.685 8.90969 
2017 MLT 8.520001727 160.511 76.357066 76.7676 140.757 10.304 
2018 MLT 8.402025239 . 75.99658279 . . . 
2019 MLT 8.888460997 . 75.16031482 . . . 
2015 NLD 5.555060361 121.915 111.6036336 113.148 100.408 2.08536 
2016 NLD 5.689785743 118.975 114.5655246 111.735 98.2081 5.99899 
2017 NLD 6.077995787 116.311 111.1438658 110.936 96.9775 9.72073 
2018 NLD 6.162503131 . 105.4856219 . . . 
2019 NLD 6.212310141 . 100.029744 . . . 
2015 NOR . 59.1403 138.6784963 134.49 58.3657 0.021635 
2016 NOR . 62.672 145.8085927 142.78 60.3416 0.015664 
2017 NOR . 62.2743 146.4868716 141.68 61.6311 0.011429 
2018 NOR . . 144.3367621 . . . 
2019 NOR . . 151.3905887 . . . 
2015 PAN 10.16602664 67.8544 85.31330866 78.4952 66.412 10.2789 
2016 PAN 11.44967953 64.1639 86.74549596 77.7589 62.6607 9.71258 
2017 PAN 12.48097873 63.0628 87.14141015 78.6015 61.485 9.30182 
2018 PAN 12.48736664 . 86.5838255 . . . 
2019 PAN . . 86.83744047 . . . 
2015 POL 9.369575568 61.6271 53.56507535 51.9022 53.5721 0.00128 
2016 POL 9.514343125 64.6357 54.41781993 52.8463 55.7538 0.001175 
2017 POL 10.01778182 65.042 52.4582189 51.6862 55.6892 0.00108 
2018 POL 9.770492632 . 52.53377829 . . . 
2019 POL 9.563012313 . 50.80275801 . . . 
2015 PRT 7.206073883 95.1823 119.8348531 122.345 80.1822 3.48221 
2016 PRT 6.532966822 97.3506 111.2430748 113.353 82.1243 9.13039 
2017 PRT 7.656912471 99.9617 102.606207 105.146 84.8384 12.8384 
2018 PRT 7.039359602 . 96.9928843 . . . 
2019 PRT 7.66166516 . 90.71544782 . . . 
2015 ROU 8.178320995 38.5057 29.92980237 35.7018 32.4191 . 
2016 ROU 8.924362057 38.9727 28.12767901 33.4169 32.3907 . 
2017 ROU 8.888647238 38.454 26.47339333 31.0008 31.614 . 
2018 ROU 9.342160174 . 25.72739123 . . . 
2019 ROU 10.19908107 . 24.71600388 . . . 
2015 SGP 9.000746071 123.449 122.4213538 126.138 115.612 1.78335 
 84
2016 SGP 9.229952907 126.023 123.8724342 126.856 117.574 1.95559 
2017 SGP 9.177550102 127.628 121.4777354 127.846 118.592 2.01873 
2018 SGP 9.025732078 . 118.9411619 . . . 
2019 SGP 9.323883966 . 120.7801442 . . . 
2015 SVK 11.12241104 63.2096 52.73321372 50.6234 49.8074 2.64395 
2016 SVK 10.97713003 66.2086 57.07118384 54.2697 52.1789 6.65956 
2017 SVK 10.7723217 67.2862 60.18141657 57.286 53.105 8.89895 
2018 SVK 10.57699455 . 61.97090266 . . . 
2019 SVK 10.43667218 . 62.89592359 . . . 
2015 SVN . 65.5713 49.88664735 51.3306 53.3926 3.27855 
2016 SVN . 67.0104 46.64183861 47.353 54.6755 8.42732 
2017 SVN . 67.1681 45.06457222 44.5703 55.0942 12.4276 
2018 SVN 10.68824839 . 43.32055538 . . . 
2019 SVN 10.61128698 . 42.45886934 . . . 
2015 ESP 7.443005041 108.246 119.2608506 121.449 95.5009 5.6111 
2016 ESP 7.788720614 109.728 111.8075307 111.554 96.826 11.1507 
2017 ESP 7.615906488 109.74 105.8952531 104.946 96.8128 17.3351 
2018 ESP 7.552418118 . 99.4891388 . . . 
2019 ESP 7.592382727 . 104.1851038 . . . 
2015 SWE . 64.6267 126.6334465 125.353 62.6981 2.11027 
2016 SWE 6.122644188 66.7741 128.5219741 125.976 65.1938 5.32031 
2017 SWE 6.128294357 70.0173 131.2817426 128.164 68.3736 7.19686 
2018 SWE 6.184781181 . 131.8716958 . . . 
2019 SWE 6.328285226 . 132.6795034 . . . 
2015 CHE 7.290805951 188.336 170.2815923 169.068 168.956 0.285709 
2016 CHE 7.120629094 189.897 174.5953238 172.103 171.254 0.282623 
2017 CHE 8.017107046 . . . . . 
2018 CHE 8.300509843 . . . . . 
2019 CHE 8.59195491 . . . . . 
2015 TUR 11.00131461 42.8183 66.47789735 61.635 44.4709 0.541655 
2016 TUR 10.72799293 44.341 69.37306617 64.7434 46.335 0.589562 
2017 TUR 10.71991578 43.756 70.33290578 65.1126 45.9642 0.618009 
2018 TUR 10.79392098 . 67.41352606 . . . 
2019 TUR 11.74870387 . 65.35258427 . . . 
2015 GBR 6.838229264 134.022 130.8373537 132.478 . 0.024727 
2016 GBR 7.025170524 135.721 132.0912924 130.067 . 0.11454 
2017 GBR 6.78469169 141.888 133.9656422 131.704 . 0.25659 
2018 GBR 6.816460065 . 134.4710918 . . . 
2019 GBR . . 133.6082323 . . . 
2015 USA 11.71105298 73.4958 179.7718011 178.884 80.6066 23.2626 
2016 USA 11.58548941 74.972 182.7852235 178.89 80.9675 22.6159 
2017 USA 11.65000958 75.2735 190.76544 183.134 80.8253 21.7465 
2018 USA 11.68621915 . 179.5079791 . . . 
2019 USA 11.77650334 . 191.1649538 . . . 
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2015 BHS . 54.9985 54.66919425 55.5347 52.3382 4.79753 
2016 BHS . 56.1162 51.73492057 53.0835 53.277 5.3562 
2017 BHS . 57.1725 . 50.0022 54.4462 4.81756 
2018 BHS . . . . . . 
2019 BHS . . . . . . 
2015 BGD 5.546805146 56.127 44.40697181 38.5423 44.8963 0.863638 
2016 BGD 5.631425062 56.9249 45.27950522 39.0383 44.3797 0.834905 
2017 BGD 5.175476795 57.7717 47.58329625 40.721 43.6314 0.797724 
2018 BGD 4.74201086 . 46.93898318 . . . 
2019 BGD 5.168285407 . 45.31297481 . . . 
2015 BTN 17.6113939 61.0014 46.43944705 53.1765 56.1128 0.023378 
2016 BTN 15.44890886 62.5204 48.18792134 57.0257 57.1679 0.033886 
2017 BTN 12.97109772 65.6274 51.29828135 58.7815 60.2593 0.042613 
2018 BTN 13.73652938 . 58.09305413 . . . 
2019 BTN 12.17622989 . 64.39133044 . . . 
2015 BWA 8.524321018 42.2143 33.77325412 32.505 40.8385 0.051668 
2016 BWA 8.440349226 40.4209 31.5127238 30.2643 39.3467 0.046603 
2017 BWA 8.766129725 39.9119 31.415584 30.7481 38.8259 0.047454 
2018 BWA 9.445044144 . 31.70305433 . . . 
2019 BWA 11.93477228 . 32.77338855 . . . 
2015 ZMB 11.16038541 18.3851 19.76483406 16.9988 19.2042 3.67875 
2016 ZMB 12.08671141 18.2512 15.44212051 16.1533 19.1483 4.73024 
2017 ZMB 11.234619 18.596 14.90601054 12.4731 18.0015 5.09134 
2018 ZMB 11.15824046 . 14.97369229 . . . 
2019 ZMB 11.09037391 . 15.62617575 . . . 
2015 FJI 8.484491747 50.35 78.76592863 78.5497 66.7572 1.07118 
2016 FJI 9.170700194 54.6964 84.42514511 86.6614 70.3497 0.987749 
2017 FJI 8.864193639 56.4113 86.20668127 91.4575 71.2914 0.887531 
2018 FJI 9.937814995 . 92.7959711 . . . 
2019 FJI 10.95989152 . 100.6734744 . . . 
2015 ZWE . 22.7646 18.31568566 18.3289 22.3373 6.63157 
2016 ZWE . 25.2076 17.09856236 17.2416 24.7551 9.81362 
2017 ZWE . 30.2901 16.8751082 16.2244 29.0104 15.6259 
2018 ZWE . . 16.69432406 . . . 
2019 ZWE . . 51.83152205 . . . 
2015 WSM 16.2 33.8598 75.40348535 70.0117 39.6684 2.14948 
2016 WSM 16.345366 35.1536 78.73821108 75.0508 41.0522 1.74247 
2017 WSM 15.77 37.4558 82.56487047 79.0269 43.8296 0.836038 
2018 WSM 16.616114 . 87.20137244 . . . 
2019 WSM 16.24512706 . 89.18437279 . . . 
2015 EST 10.75402971 71.2828 68.46719659 67.5523 56.9173 0.147055 
2016 EST 10.82605197 73.9156 69.21554981 67.7501 59.6426 0.288862 
2017 EST 12.77038406 72.9985 64.06723719 64.8151 59.1892 0.30143 
2018 EST 12.71387377 . 61.93707717 . . . 
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2019 EST 12.07431823 . 58.97400317 . . . 
2015 CYM . . . . . . 
2016 CYM . . . . . . 
2017 CYM . . . . . . 
2018 CYM . . . . . . 
2019 CYM . . . . . . 
2015 MDG 11.5928709 23.5359 12.31058917 12.5164 16.6155 3.87739 
2016 MDG 10.73195445 20.8128 11.88781274 12.5327 17.3678 4.13521 
2017 MDG 10.3017242 22.8318 12.70612297 13.0303 18.5873 3.73254 
2018 MDG 10.60891157 . 12.88203606 . . . 
2019 MDG 10.06591274 . 14.20165625 . . . 
2015 AND . . . . . . 
2016 AND . . . . . . 
2017 AND . . . . . . 
2018 AND . . . . . . 
2019 AND . . . . . . 
2015 BMU . . . . . . 
2016 BMU . . . . . . 
2017 BMU . . . . . . 
2018 BMU . . . . . . 
2019 BMU . . . . . . 
2015 COK . . . . . . 
2016 COK . . . . . . 
2017 COK . . . . . . 
2018 COK . . . . . . 
2019 COK . . . . . . 
2015 IMN . . . . . . 
2016 IMN . . . . . . 
2017 IMN . . . . . . 
2018 IMN . . . . . . 
2019 IMN . . . . . . 
2015 MNG . 45.3114 53.85912013 54.6246 42.4317 2.46388 
2016 MNG . 46.7898 56.91575245 52.8172 44.0222 3.99944 
2017 MNG . 50.6255 53.07239832 49.0532 47.9875 4.49403 
2018 MNG . . 55.69985587 . . . 
2019 MNG . . 49.63345053 . . . 
2015 UKR 8.01647621 37.4259 56.65775413 66.1193 38.9909 20.9579 
2016 UKR 9.781221922 30.1439 47.30713009 47.1415 31.2373 17.1038 
2017 UKR 11.9029128 27.1971 38.27106413 38.4239 28.0747 13.2715 
2018 UKR 10.7659697 . 34.50900898 . . . 






Control Variables part 2 
 





2015 AUS 1.56 1.36 1.88 
2016 AUS 1.57 1.35 1.82 
2017 AUS 1.54 1.39 1.80 
2018 AUS 1.60 1.43 1.81 
2019 AUS 1.57 1.32 1.81 
2015 AUT 1.48 1.38 1.52 
2016 AUT 1.51 1.34 1.55 
2017 AUT 1.46 1.34 1.53 
2018 AUT 1.45 1.38 1.60 
2019 AUT 1.49 1.33 1.55 
2015 BEL 1.44 1.39 1.57 
2016 BEL 1.33 1.38 1.64 
2017 BEL 1.18 1.38 1.50 
2018 BEL 1.17 1.40 1.51 
2019 BEL 1.03 1.37 1.55 
2015 BRL -0.18 0.46 -0.40 
2016 BRL -0.17 0.45 -0.38 
2017 BRL -0.29 0.45 -0.53 
2018 BRL -0.45 0.40 -0.40 
2019 BRL -0.19 0.34 -0.33 
2015 BGR 0.21 0.43 -0.26 
2016 BGR 0.30 0.40 -0.17 
2017 BGR 0.26 0.38 -0.16 
2018 BGR 0.27 0.32 -0.15 
2019 BGR 0.34 0.38 -0.16 
2015 CAN 1.76 1.47 1.89 
2016 CAN 1.78 1.45 1.99 
2017 CAN 1.85 1.48 1.92 
2018 CAN 1.72 1.53 1.83 
2019 CAN 1.73 1.46 1.77 
2015 HRV 0.51 0.56 0.25 
2016 HRV 0.49 0.53 0.20 
2017 HRV 0.57 0.51 0.19 
2018 HRV 0.46 0.50 0.13 
2019 HRV 0.41 0.53 0.13 
2015 CYP 1.05 1.03 1.01 
2016 CYP 0.96 1.05 0.83 
2017 CYP 0.92 1.06 0.78 
2018 CYP 0.92 1.04 0.64 
2019 CYP 0.99 1.08 0.60 
2015 CZE 1.05 1.04 0.43 
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2016 CZE 1.04 1.03 0.54 
2017 CZE 1.01 0.97 0.57 
2018 CZE 0.92 0.93 0.50 
2019 CZE 0.89 0.94 0.51 
2015 DNK 1.85 1.55 2.21 
2016 DNK 1.88 1.54 2.23 
2017 DNK 1.80 1.52 2.19 
2018 DNK 1.87 1.61 2.15 
2019 DNK 1.94 1.58 2.11 
2015 FIN 1.81 1.54 2.28 
2016 FIN 1.83 1.53 2.24 
2017 FIN 1.94 1.55 2.22 
2018 FIN 1.98 1.61 2.21 
2019 FIN 1.93 1.59 2.15 
2015 FRA 1.44 1.21 1.31 
2016 FRA 1.41 1.14 1.40 
2017 FRA 1.35 1.15 1.26 
2018 FRA 1.48 1.18 1.32 
2019 FRA 1.38 1.14 1.30 
2015 DEU 1.74 1.42 1.84 
2016 DEU 1.73 1.36 1.84 
2017 DEU 1.72 1.39 1.84 
2018 DEU 1.62 1.42 1.95 
2019 DEU 1.59 1.34 1.90 
2015 GRC 0.26 0.65 -0.08 
2016 GRC 0.23 0.67 -0.09 
2017 GRC 0.31 0.71 -0.14 
2018 GRC 0.34 0.86 -0.07 
2019 GRC 0.41 0.94 -0.01 
2015 HKG 1.91 0.51 1.65 
2016 HKG 1.84 0.38 1.56 
2017 HKG 1.90 0.43 1.61 
2018 HKG 1.90 0.47 1.68 
2019 HKG 1.74 0.21 1.67 
2015 HUN 0.50 0.56 0.15 
2016 HUN 0.46 0.40 0.10 
2017 HUN 0.52 0.37 0.09 
2018 HUN 0.49 0.32 0.05 
2019 HUN 0.50 0.22 0.00 
2015 ISL 1.49 1.38 1.94 
2016 ISL 1.39 1.36 1.95 
2017 ISL 1.45 1.38 1.84 
2018 ISL 1.47 1.41 1.84 
2019 ISL 1.52 1.33 1.71 
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2015 IRL 1.53 1.33 1.62 
2016 IRL 1.33 1.29 1.58 
2017 IRL 1.29 1.29 1.55 
2018 IRL 1.42 1.32 1.55 
2019 IRL 1.28 1.34 1.46 
2015 ITA 0.45 1.03 0.02 
2016 ITA 0.53 1.03 0.08 
2017 ITA 0.50 1.05 0.19 
2018 ITA 0.41 1.05 0.24 
2019 ITA 0.46 0.97 0.24 
2015 JPN 1.78 0.99 1.57 
2016 JPN 1.82 0.98 1.52 
2017 JPN 1.62 1.00 1.52 
2018 JPN 1.68 1.02 1.42 
2019 JPN 1.59 0.96 1.48 
2015 KOR 1.01 0.63 0.37 
2016 KOR 1.06 0.64 0.46 
2017 KOR 1.07 0.74 0.48 
2018 KOR 1.18 0.80 0.60 
2019 KOR 1.38 0.77 0.76 
2015 LVA 1.09 0.85 0.47 
2016 LVA 1.01 0.84 0.43 
2017 LVA 0.90 0.80 0.54 
2018 LVA 1.04 0.81 0.33 
2019 LVA 1.11 0.88 0.48 
2015 LTU 1.18 0.97 0.62 
2016 LTU 1.07 1.00 0.71 
2017 LTU 0.97 0.99 0.55 
2018 LTU 1.07 0.92 0.50 
2019 LTU 1.04 1.02 0.68 
2015 LUX 1.72 1.55 2.10 
2016 LUX 1.69 1.50 2.10 
2017 LUX 1.68 1.52 1.99 
2018 LUX 1.78 1.57 2.09 
2019 LUX 1.73 1.52 2.11 
2015 MLT 0.85 1.20 0.90 
2016 MLT 0.96 1.20 0.72 
2017 MLT 1.00 1.17 0.74 
2018 MLT 0.97 1.12 0.58 
2019 MLT 0.86 1.11 0.24 
2015 NLD 1.83 1.56 1.88 
2016 NLD 1.83 1.54 1.91 
2017 NLD 1.85 1.57 1.87 
2018 NLD 1.85 1.60 2.01 
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2019 NLD 1.80 1.56 2.00 
2015 NOR 1.86 1.69 2.24 
2016 NOR 1.87 1.66 2.20 
2017 NOR 1.98 1.69 2.24 
2018 NOR 1.89 1.73 2.09 
2019 NOR 1.86 1.69 2.07 
2015 PAN 0.29 0.56 -0.37 
2016 PAN 0.19 0.52 -0.49 
2017 PAN 0.02 0.52 -0.54 
2018 PAN -0.02 0.57 -0.55 
2019 PAN 0.07 0.62 -0.58 
2015 POL 0.80 1.04 0.67 
2016 POL 0.71 0.84 0.74 
2017 POL 0.64 0.78 0.72 
2018 POL 0.66 0.72 0.64 
2019 POL 0.60 0.70 0.60 
2015 PRT 1.22 1.13 0.96 
2016 PRT 1.21 1.16 0.93 
2017 PRT 1.33 1.21 0.87 
2018 PRT 1.21 1.21 0.85 
2019 PRT 1.15 1.24 0.76 
2015 ROU -0.06 0.49 -0.02 
2016 ROU -0.17 0.54 -0.02 
2017 ROU -0.17 0.52 -0.03 
2018 ROU -0.25 0.46 -0.12 
2019 ROU -0.28 0.49 -0.13 
2015 SGP 2.24 -0.16 2.09 
2016 SGP 2.21 -0.15 2.09 
2017 SGP 2.22 -0.17 2.13 
2018 SGP 2.23 -0.06 2.17 
2019 SGP 2.22 -0.18 2.16 
2015 SVK 0.84 0.97 0.18 
2016 SVK 0.89 0.96 0.23 
2017 SVK 0.80 0.94 0.22 
2018 SVK 0.71 0.88 0.36 
2019 SVK 0.67 0.91 0.33 
2015 SVN 0.97 0.99 0.77 
2016 SVN 1.13 1.01 0.82 
2017 SVN 1.17 1.01 0.81 
2018 SVN 1.13 0.99 0.87 
2019 SVN 1.08 1.01 0.91 
2015 ESP 1.17 1.04 0.58 
2016 ESP 1.12 1.04 0.52 
2017 ESP 1.03 1.03 0.49 
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2018 ESP 1.00 1.07 0.61 
2019 ESP 1.00 1.09 0.65 
2015 SWE 1.82 1.57 2.24 
2016 SWE 1.77 1.56 2.19 
2017 SWE 1.84 1.58 2.14 
2018 SWE 1.83 1.61 2.14 
2019 SWE 1.83 1.59 2.12 
2015 CHE 2.00 1.56 2.14 
2016 CHE 2.01 1.53 1.99 
2017 CHE 2.06 1.56 1.99 
2018 CHE 2.04 1.62 2.01 
2019 CHE 1.95 1.53 1.98 
2015 TUR 0.22 -0.37 -0.15 
2016 TUR 0.05 -0.61 -0.19 
2017 TUR 0.08 -0.71 -0.19 
2018 TUR 0.01 -0.83 -0.34 
2019 TUR 0.05 -0.81 -0.29 
2015 GBR 1.74 1.30 1.88 
2016 GBR 1.60 1.30 1.90 
2017 GBR 1.41 1.33 1.84 
2018 GBR 1.34 1.39 1.83 
2019 GBR 1.44 1.26 1.77 
2015 USA 1.46 1.11 1.40 
2016 USA 1.48 1.11 1.37 
2017 USA 1.55 1.05 1.38 
2018 USA 1.58 1.05 1.33 
2019 USA 1.49 0.97 1.22 
2015 BHS 0.71 0.95 1.14 
2016 BHS 0.72 0.85 1.11 
2017 BHS 0.58 0.85 1.17 
2018 BHS 0.54 0.80 1.13 
2019 BHS 0.49 0.93 1.18 
2015 BGD -0.72 -0.51 -0.81 
2016 BGD -0.68 -0.58 -0.86 
2017 BGD -0.73 -0.61 -0.83 
2018 BGD -0.75 -0.73 -0.91 
2019 BGD -0.74 -0.72 -0.99 
2015 BTN 0.41 -0.03 1.02 
2016 BTN 0.50 -0.03 1.13 
2017 BTN 0.57 0.01 1.57 
2018 BTN 0.36 0.06 1.65 
2019 BTN 0.31 0.10 1.62 
2015 BWA 0.50 0.44 0.85 
2016 BWA 0.53 0.40 0.93 
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2017 BWA 0.44 0.39 0.79 
2018 BWA 0.33 0.48 0.75 
2019 BWA 0.43 0.53 0.71 
2015 ZMB -0.56 -0.07 -0.34 
2016 ZMB -0.66 -0.30 -0.40 
2017 ZMB -0.63 -0.33 -0.54 
2018 ZMB -0.56 -0.32 -0.66 
2019 ZMB -0.68 -0.29 -0.64 
2015 FJI -0.29 0.03 0.17 
2016 FJI -0.25 0.03 0.13 
2017 FJI 0.09 0.18 0.36 
2018 FJI 0.26 0.22 0.38 
2019 FJI 0.20 0.09 0.56 
2015 ZWE -1.16 -1.17 -1.31 
2016 ZWE -1.16 -1.18 -1.26 
2017 ZWE -1.19 -1.19 -1.27 
2018 ZWE -1.20 -1.12 -1.23 
2019 ZWE -1.21 -1.14 -1.24 
2015 WSM 0.51 0.74 0.29 
2016 WSM 0.54 0.77 0.28 
2017 WSM 0.62 0.78 0.66 
2018 WSM 0.59 0.76 0.64 
2019 WSM 0.44 0.75 0.64 
2015 EST 1.07 1.19 1.29 
2016 EST 1.09 1.21 1.27 
2017 EST 1.11 1.21 1.24 
2018 EST 1.19 1.21 1.51 
2019 EST 1.17 1.21 1.54 
2015 CYM 1.17 0.47 1.02 
2016 CYM 1.18 0.47 0.53 
2017 CYM 1.23 0.48 0.53 
2018 CYM 1.20 0.49 0.50 
2019 CYM 1.17 0.50 0.47 
2015 MDG -1.29 -0.38 -0.85 
2016 MDG -1.17 -0.32 -0.91 
2017 MDG -1.14 -0.34 -1.05 
2018 MDG -1.15 -0.30 -1.00 
2019 MDG -1.14 -0.22 -1.01 
2015 AND 1.79 1.19 1.22 
2016 AND 1.86 1.18 1.23 
2017 AND 1.94 1.16 1.24 
2018 AND 1.94 1.07 1.24 
2019 AND 1.91 1.14 1.23 
2015 BMU 1.01 . 1.22 
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2016 BMU 1.33 . 1.23 
2017 BMU 1.39 . 1.24 
2018 BMU 1.39 . 1.24 
2019 BMU 1.36 . 1.23 
2015 COK . . . 
2016 COK . . . 
2017 COK . . . 
2018 COK . . . 
2019 COK . . . 
2015 IMN . . . 
2016 IMN . . . 
2017 IMN . . . 
2018 IMN . . . 
2019 IMN . . . 
2015 MNG -0.42 0.27 -0.49 
2016 MNG -0.10 0.33 -0.49 
2017 MNG -0.26 0.29 -0.45 
2018 MNG -0.23 0.26 -0.43 
2019 MNG -0.19 0.35 -0.44 
2015 UKR -0.52 -0.09 -0.98 
2016 UKR -0.57 0.00 -0.81 
2017 UKR -0.46 0.01 -0.78 
2018 UKR -0.42 -0.01 -0.87 






                              (1)             (2)    
                              OLS              RE    
---------------------------------------------------- 
Rating                   4.58e+06        5.38e+05*   
                       (3.31e+06)      (3.17e+05)    
d16                      1.57e+05**      1.20e+05    
                      (68175.991)     (74302.681)    
d17                      2.34e+05**      2.07e+05**  
                       (1.15e+05)     (86885.941)    
d18                         0.000           0.000    
                              (.)             (.)    
d19                         0.000           0.000    
                              (.)             (.)    
Label=1                     0.000                    
                              (.)                    
Label=2                 -1.95e+06***                 
                       (6.00e+05)                    
Label=3                 -6.51e+06**                  
                       (3.13e+06)                    
Label=5                  1.56e+06                    
                       (3.79e+06)                    
Label=6                 -7.46e+06***                 
                       (2.13e+06)                    
Label=7                 -6.84e+05                    
                       (1.08e+06)                    
Label=8                 -7.17e+06**                  
                       (2.93e+06)                    
Label=9                 -4.37e+06*                   
                       (2.22e+06)                    
Label=11                -3.38e+06*                   
                       (1.92e+06)                    
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Label=12                -2.66e+06***                 
                       (7.13e+05)                    
Label=13                -7.38e+06**                  
                       (3.21e+06)                    
Label=14                -4.83e+06*                   
                       (2.62e+06)                    
Label=15                -2.32e+06                    
                       (3.01e+06)                    
Label=16                -1.25e+07**                  
                       (5.02e+06)                    
Label=17                -3.73e+06**                  
                       (1.72e+06)                    
Label=18                -4.46e+06                    
                       (3.21e+06)                    
Label=19                -1.43e+06                    
                       (9.77e+05)                    
Label=20                -4.95e+06***                 
                       (1.83e+06)                    
Label=21                -4.98e+06**                  
                       (2.39e+06)                    
Label=22                -4.06e+06                    
                       (3.53e+06)                    
Label=23                -2.50e+06                    
                       (1.55e+06)                    
Label=24                -3.10e+06**                  
                       (1.39e+06)                    
Label=25                -8.67e+06                    
                       (5.98e+06)                    
Label=26                -6.08e+06*                   
                       (3.14e+06)                    
Label=27                -2.03e+06                    
                       (4.36e+06)                    
Label=28                -5.93e+06***                 
                       (1.54e+06)                    
Label=30                 4.37e+06***                 
                       (1.22e+06)                    
Label=31                -3.22e+06***                 
                       (1.20e+06)                    
Label=32                -1.95e+06                    
                       (3.73e+06)                    
Label=33                 1.22e+06                    
                       (6.28e+06)                    
Label=34                 2.43e+05                    
                       (5.69e+06)                    
Label=35                -8.51e+06***                 
                       (7.74e+05)                    
Label=36                -1.21e+06                    
                       (2.39e+06)                    
Label=37                -2.27e+06                    
                       (4.00e+06)                    
Label=38                -2.51e+06                    
                       (2.67e+06)                    
Label=40                 7.75e+05                    
                       (8.05e+06)                    
Label=45                -2.21e+06                    
                       (2.81e+06)                    
Label=46                    0.000                    
                              (.)                    
lGDPperCap              -1.16e+05       -5.39e+04    
                       (8.64e+05)      (3.02e+05)    
Liquid liabilities~)    -5449.236       -1.96e+04    
                      (25997.764)     (18554.579)    
Domestic credit to~o    -3.40e+04***    -2004.558    
                      (10031.168)      (5122.527)    
Bank deposits to G~)    -1.85e+04       11529.861    
                      (24289.101)     (21368.885)    
Central bank asset~)    -4.86e+04***    -2.90e+04*   
                      (17114.698)     (14999.189)    
GovtEffectiveness       -2696.277       -2.55e+05    
                       (4.43e+05)      (4.18e+05)    
VA                       5.81e+05        3.63e+05    
                       (7.85e+05)      (4.41e+05)    
CoC                      7.34e+05*       1.39e+05    
                       (4.02e+05)      (3.39e+05)    
Constant                -2.82e+06        2.18e+05    
                       (1.64e+07)      (2.43e+06)    
---------------------------------------------------- 
R-squared                   0.949                    
N                         107.000         107.000    
---------------------------------------------------- 

















BTN WSM COK AND BWA MDG BMU FJI ZMB BHS ZWE
Countries receiving < 1800 annual reports





SVN HRV CYM LTU ISL CYP IMN CAN MNG
Countries receiving 1800 - 2500 annual reports







SVK PAN MLT BGR AUT BGD CZE POL
Countries receiving 2500 - 5000 annual reports





BRL EST ESP ROU CHE NOR HUN
Countries receiving 5000 - 15000 annual reports
























SWE BEL SGP LVA LUX DNK GRC IRL FIN
Countries receiving 15000 - 70000 annual reports








HKG FRA ITA DEU TUR AUS
Countries receiving 70000 - 250000 annual reports









JPN GBR KOR USA NLD UKR
Countries receiving > 250000 annual reports































































































































































































Isle of Man 
https://www.fiu.im/open-data/ 
 
Ghana 
https://fic.gov.gh/index.php/publications/annual-reports 
 
Mongolia 
https://www.mongolbank.mn/eng/listcma.aspx 
 
Ukraine 
https://fiu.gov.ua/en/pages/dijalnist/funkcional/zviti-pro-diyalnist 
 
 
